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ADDENDUM

10

agreement thaz has been stated on the record, whereby
Mr, Smith would plead to first-degree murder as
outlined on the record.
41

I telephoned Rowena Hcskins, reviewed that

5

with her, and she has given me authority to indicate to

6

the Court that she is in agreement with that plea

71

bargain and is satisfied that —
the family members —

91

represents —

on behalf of her and

that she has told me she

that the —

that being the wife of

10

Mr. Bray, another sister, and a child of Mr. 3ray

11

that they are satisfied with a plea of guilty to this

12

offense and a commitment of a life sentence —

12

they are satisfied.

14
15

THE COURT:

All right.

—

that

Thank you, Mr.

Chamberlain.

16

MR. CHAMBERLAIN:

17

THE COURT:

Thank you.

I'd like the record to reflect that

18

prior to taking the bench here in the open courtroom,

19

all counsel and I discussed this proposed plea

^0|

bargain —

211

everyone was aware of what the proposal was about

including Mr. Chamberlain —

so that

before I took the bench.
Well, based upon the representations made,
I'm going to find that there is a factual basis upon
which the plea may be rested.

And I'm going to also

PAUL G. MCMULLIN, CSR, RPR
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THE COURT:

We're back in session.

It's 20

minutes to 2:00.
I'll first call Criminal No. 631, State cf
Utah versus Tracy Eugene Smith.
MR. SHUMATE:

They are just removing the

handcuffs on Mr. Smith, Your Honor, so that he can have
the hands in front of him so he can sign this item.
If I could approach the bench, Your Honor,
I can give Your Honor a copy of this.

We'll keep the

original while we execute it.
THE COURT:

All right.

Thank you.

The record should reflect that Mr. Smith
is now present with his counsel Mr. Shumate.
This matter comes on at your request.

Did

you want to tell the Court what we're doing?
MR. SHUMATE:

Yes, Your Honor.

This matter is

before the Court for the arraignment before Your Honor
and the entry of a plea pursuant to a .plea bargain
agreement entered into between the defendant, myself,
and the State of Utah, represented by Mr. Kaneli.
The defendant is presently charged with
first-degree murder, a capital offense.

The plea

PAUL G. MCMULLIN, CSR, RPR

agreement contemplates a plea of guilty to be entered
to that offense on a conditional basis.

That is, that

if the Court 'were to impose the sentence of death, that
4|

the conditional plea could be withdrawn.

5

were to impose the sentence of life imprisonment, then

6

the plea would stand.

7|

Mr. Smith and I have discussed the matter
in substantial detail.

9

If the Court

The case has been through a

preliminary hearing and, of course, was bound over for

10

arraignment today.

11

Regarding Plea Bargain and certificates of counsel have

12

been prepared.

13

it.

14

here in open court before Your Honor.

15

Mr. Smith has read it; has initialed

He has not yet signed it but intends to sign it

THE COURT:

16
17]

The Statement of Defendant

All right.

Is your full, true, and correct name Tracy
Eugene Smith?

13

MR. SMITH:

Yes, sir.

19|

THE COURT:

All right.

MR. SMITH:

21.

THE COURT:

And do you read and write English?

MR. SMITH:

Yes, sir.

THE COURT:

Have you read the Information which

24|

And hew old are you,

has been filed in this case against ycu?

P

D

RfiTT

1 R

. ** A.

—

C ••

r?^—.—.——

TT*.

/ a r\ * \

*•* •* *

4
MR. SMITH:

Yes, sir.

THE COURT:

All right.

that Information with you.

I'm going to go through

It's relatively short.

I'm

going to read it to you now.
State of Utah versus Tracy Eugene Smith.
Date of birth, March 16, 1967.
MR. SMITH:

17th.

THE COURT:

March 17, 1967.

I'll make that

amendment.
Information in Circuit Court No. 88-CR-ll,
District Court No. 631.
The undersigned under oath states on
information and belief that the above-named defendant,
Tracy Eugene Smith, committed the following criminal
offense, to wit: Murder in the first-degree, a capital
offense, in violation of Section 76-5-201 and 76-5-202
(1) (d), Utah Code Annotated as amended 1952, in that
on or about the 3rd day of October, 1938, within Beaver
County, State of Utah, the said defendant intentionally
or knowingly caused the death of James Glen Bray under
wu6 A.elbowing circumstances.
"The homicide was committed while the
actor was engaged in the commission of or an attempt to
commit an aggravated robbery or robbery."

In addition,

a firearm was used in the commission or in furtherance

PAUL G. MCMULLIN, CSR, RPR

w

of the -felony.
This Information was based en evidence
obtained from Raymond Goodwin and Sheriff Kenneth
Yardiey.

Signed by Leo G. Kane11, Beaver County

Attorney.

Authorize by presentment and filing by

Mr. Kanell and subscribed and sworn to by me on the 6th
day of October, 1988.
Do you understand the Information,
Mr. Smith?
MR. SMITH:

Yes, sir.

THE COURT:

All right.

You have the right in

this matter to be represented by an attorney.

And you

are represented by Mr. Shumate standing there beside
you; is that correct?
MR. SMITH:

Yes, sir.

THE COURT:

And have you had an opportunity to

consult with him to your satisfaction?
MR. SMITH:

Yes, sir.

THE COURT:

Okay.

You also have the right to

require the State to prove each and every element of
this offense beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial
either before the Court or before a jury.
The elements of the offense which the
State would have to prove and which you would be
admitting if you plead guilty in this matter ara
PAUL G. MCMULLIIJ, CSR, RPR

6
these:

That on or about the 3rd cay of October, 1D88,

within this county and state, you intentionally or
knowingly caused the death of James Glen Bray while
engaged in the commission of or attempt to commit
aggravated robbery or robbery.
Do you understand those elements?
MR. SMITH:

Yes, sir.

THE COURT:

Now, as I understand the law —

correct me if I'm wrong —

and

the firearms enhancement

does not apply in a capital case.
Is that correct?

There is no firearms

enhancement?
MR. KANELL:

I'm not aware of any enhancement

under that section.
THE COURT:

Is that correct?

MR. SHUMATE:
THE COURT:

The Court is correct, Your Honor.
So I won't explain the firearms

enhancement.
Do you understand all those elements that
I just went over?
MR. SMITH:

Yes, sir.

THE COURT:

If you admit these elements by

pleading guilty to this offense, then the State doesn't
have to prove them at all.

You'll stand convicted by

your own statement.
PAUL G. MCMULLIN, CSR, RPR

Do you understand that?
MR. SMITH:

Yes, sir.

THE COURT:

All right.

If you decided to go

forward with the trial, you would have the right at the
trial to confront and cross-examine the witnesses
against you, meaning you would have the right to hear
them testify and ask them questions through your legal
counsel.

You would have the right not to testify or

give evidence against yourself, meaning nobody could
call you as a witness; nobody could make you make a
statement.

And, of course, if you plead guilty, you111

make a statement which is the ultimate evidence against
you.

You would have also the right to present any

evidence you wish to in that trial or to testify if you
chose to testify.
Do you understand all those rights?

THE COURT:

Okay.

waive all those rights.

If you plead guilty, you
The trial —

the trial will

not take place, and you won't have those opportunities
and those rights I just explained.
Do you understand that?
MR. SMITH:

Uh-huh.

THE COURT:

You have to answer out loud.

MR. SMITH:

Yes, sir.
PAUL G. MCMULLIN, CSR, RPR

THE COURT:

Thank you.

If this offense is

admitted by you, it could be punishable by death, or it
cculd be punishable by life imprisonment.
Normally a trier —
those —

the sentence.

a jury would determine

You would have a right to have

6|

a jury determine which of those sentences would be

7|

imposed if you were convicted of the offense.
Again, if you plead guilty under the

91

conditions of this agreement, this would entail a

10

conditional plea, meaning that you would plead guilty

11

upon basically a commitment by the Court that a life

12

sentence would be the punishment that would be imposed

13

as opposed to death.

14

pronounced the death sentence, you would have the right

15

to withdraw your plea,

16

And if the Court, in fact,

Do you understand that?

17

MR. SMITH:

Yes, sir,

IS

THE COURT:

All right.

Do you have any

19

questions about the nature of the charges against you

!0|

or the possible penalties?

*.1|

MR. SMITH:

No, sir.

THE COURT:

Okay.

Do you have any questions

about the fact that the State has the burden of proving
these charges?
MR. SMITH:

No, sir.
PAUL G. MCHULL2H. CSR, RPR

9
THE COURT:

Okay.

Do you have any questions at

all about anything we've discussed to this point?
MR. SMITH:

No, sir.

THE COURT:

All right.

Has anyone brought any

5

force or fear or threat to bear against you to cause

6

you to enter into this agreement?

7

MR. SMITH:

No, sir.

8

THE COURT:

All right.

9

Are you acting freely

and voluntarily?

10

MR. SMITH:

Yes, sir.

11

THE COURT:

Are you under the influence of

12

alcohol or

—

12

MR. SMITH:

No, sir.

14

THE COURT:

~

15

MR. SMITH:

No, sir.

16

THE COURT:

Mental or physical illness?

17

MR. SMITH:

No, sir.

18

THE COURT:

So you feel like there's nothing

19
20|

drugs?

impairing your ability to make a decision today?
MR. SMITH:

No, sir.

THE COURT:

Okay.

Have ycu reviewed this

Statement of Defendant Regarding Plea Bargain?
MR. SMITH:

Yes, sir.

THE COURT:

Are these your initials that appear

by- each paragraph?

PAUL G. MCMULLIN. CSR. RPR

MR. SMITH:

Yes.

THE COURT:

Have you signed the document?

MR. SHUMATE:

He has not, Your Honor.

We intend

to sign the document a- this point.
THE COURT:

All right.

Mr. Smith, having in

mind all that we've talked about today —
penalties —

the possible

and I should tell you that if you plead

guilty under these circumstances, I most likely —

most

definitely will sentence you to serve the rest of your
life in the Utah State Prison —

having that in mind,

is it your desire to enter into this plea agreement?
MR. SMITH:

Yes, sir.

THE COURT:

All right.

If that's your desire,

sign the agreement.
(Whereupon the agreement was signed.)
THE COURT:

The record should reflect that the

defendant has, in fact, affixed his signature in the
presence.of the Court.
I note in reading Paragraph 10 of the
agreement, that it was also part of the plea agreement,
that the State agreed not to request.the death penalty
and net to present any aggravating evidence at a
hearing before the Court.
Is that correct?
MR. KANELL:

That's correct. Your Honor.
PAUL G. MCMULLIN, CSR, RPR

THE COURT:

Is that part of your agreement,

Mr. Shumate?
MR. SHUMATE:

61
7

It is, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

And you understand that, Mr. Smith?

MR. SMITH:

Yes, sir.

THE COURT:

All right.

Now, have we stated the

entire agreement as you understand it, Mr. Smith?

8

MR. SMITH:

Yes, sir.

9

THE COURT:

I find that the defendant is acting

10

freely and voluntarily.

11

responsive to the questioning of the Court.

12

to know what he' s doing and what this plea agreement is

12

about.

14

He appears to be alert and

Do you agree, Mr. Shumate?

15

MR. SHUMATE:

16

THE COURT:

Do you agree, Mr. Smith?

17

MR. SMITH:

Yes, sir.

IS

MR. SHUMATE:

19
2C|

He appears

Yes, Your Honor.

Your Honor, perhaps we could make

a brief record on that.
Tracy, your family has also been here this
morning; is that correct?

221

MR. SMITH:

23

MR. SHUMATE:

24|

Yes, sir.
And you've had an opportunity to

visit with your mother, your grandmother, your aunt,
and your sister; is that correct?
PAUL G. MCMULLIN, CSR. RPR

MR- SMITH:

Yes, sir.

MR. SHUMATE:
at this time?

And they are here in the courtroom

Is that also correct?

MR. SMITH:

Yes.

MR. SHUMATE:

And it's after discussing the

matter with them and with me and with all of us
together, that you have determined to enter into this
decision; is that correct?
MR. SMITH:

Yes, sir.

MR. SHUMATE:
THE COURT:

Thank you.
Do you have any questions at all,

Mr. Smith, about anything that is contained in this
Statement of Defendant Regarding Plea Bargain?
MR. SMITH:

No, sir.

THE COURT:

Do you feel you understand your

rights in this matter?
MR. SMITH:

Yes, sir.

THE COURT:

Have I presented an adequate record,

Mr. Shumate?

Anything you can think of I need to do?

MR. SHUMATE:
THE COURT:
MR. KANELL:

Yes.

I think the Court has.

Mr. Kanell?
Yes, Your Honor.

I think that's

± dkiiC •

THE COURT:

All right.

Are you ready now to

enter your plea, then, to the charge of murder in the
PAUL G. MCMULLIN, CSR, RPR

first-degree, Mr. Smith?
MR. SMITH:

Yes, sir.

THE COURT:

What is your plea?

MR. SMITH:

Guilty.

THE COURT:

What is the factual basis?

MR. KANELL:

Your Honor, the State's case is

that the defendant, Mr. Smith, and another companion
that he had piciced up hitchhiking were traveling along
1-15 in a stolen vehicle.
As they came into Beaver County, they had
previously used up their last money for gas for the
vehicle, and they stopped at a rest station north of
town there locking for someone to rob; that a truck
driver by the name of James —
THE COURT:

excuse me.

James Glen Bray.

MR. KANELL:

James Glen Bray had stopped at the

rest stop there to —

he had made a phone call.

went into the rest room.

He

That the truck driver was

observed coming into the rest room by a witness who was
in the rest room.

He left —

as he was leaving the

rest room, he observed a black male enter the rest
room.

And as he was —

this witness was outside with

his girlfriend, he was —
loud banging sound.

in a short time, he heard a

He was not sure what it was, but

the black man then came cut of the rest room, walking

PAUL G. MCMULLIN, CSR, RPR

briskly, got into a car in the passenger's seat of the
car, and that car drove away.

This occurred shortly

after 8:00 o'clock at night.
It was dark.

The car, as it left the rest

area, kept its lights off until it got out onto the
freeway, and then the lights were turned off, and the
car sped off.
8

THE COURT:

9

MR. KANELL:

10

Turned on, you mean?
Turned on.

That's correct, Your

Honor.
The witness who was there —

11

and his

12

girlfriend —

drove en and contacted the sheriff's

13

department and gave a description of the vehicle and of

14

the black man and the white man that they had

15

observed.
The defendant and a co-defendant,

16
17

Mr. Miller, were observed in the town of Salina and

18

were stopped by officers there and questioned.

19

defendant produced a Omni weapon, which he held on his

20

per son •

That we apon was taken

The

> evidence and was

ana lyzad by the state crime lab by ballistic s experts.
It was found that the bullet that kj.lied

Mr. Bray

a n d t*AC

04*5JLX

S.4iO W

was let t in the rest room

mat ched the bullet or shell that would have been shot
by that weapon.
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And that's basically the State's case,
Your Honor.
THE COURT:

All right.

Mr. Smith, you've heard

the prosecutor's statement as to what the State's case
would sho;* in his estimation.

Let me just ask you a

couple questions to deternine whether or not there's a
factual basis for this plea.
Did you, in fact, shoot James Glen Bray in
the rest stop?
MR. SMITH:

Yes, sir.

THE COURT:

And in so doing, were you trying to

rob hin?
MR. SMITH:

No, sir.

THE COURT:

What was the reason that you shot

MR. SMITH:

Do I have to —

THE COURT:

Tell me what the reason was.

MR. SMITH:

It was more or less —

him?

tell you the truth —

do I have to?

really, to

a racial argument.

THE COURT:

A racial argument?

MR. SMITH:

Uh-huh.

THE COURT:

Mr. Shumate, do you agree that the

State's evidence cf the robbery would be as Mr. Kanell
has stated it?
MR. SHUMATE

Your Honor, the State's evidence
PAUL G. MCMULLIN. CSR, RPR
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regarding robbery will most likely come from the
co-defendant, Timothy Michael Miller, in Criminal
No- 620.
Mr. Miller was the individual driving the
vehicle at the time.

He has made statements

implicating at least an intention to seek money at the
rest areas by means of the gun.
Mr. Smith and I have discussed the
potential hazards cf taking those facts to trial, and
he and I have both agreed that the resolution of the
case as contemplated in the plea agreement is
appropriate; that the hazard cf taking the facts to
trial and resting our case solely on Mr. Smith's
testimony is such that the plea agreement is more
advisable.
THE COURT:

Is that right, Mr. Smith?

MR. SMITH:

Yes, sir.

THE COURT:

Do you understand what your attorney

is saying?
MR. SMITH:

Pretty much.

THE COURT:

You understand that he's saying that

even though.ycu disagree with the evidence about
robbery, that he fsels and has so advised you that if
your co-defendant testifies that you went there to rob
somebody, that a jury might be swayed by that, and you
PAUL G. MCMULLIN, CSR, RPR
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might receive even a more severe penalty —
penalty?

a death

Do you undersxand that?

MR- SMITH:

Yes, sir.

THE COURT:

And having that in mind, is it your

desire to enter into a plea agreement, knowing that
you1re going to be sentenced to prison for the rest of
your life?
MR. SMITH:

Yes, sir.

THE COURT:

Is that a satisfactory record,

Mr. Kanell?
MR. KANELL:
THE COURT:
MR. SHUMATE:

Yes, Your Honor.
Mr. Shumate?
Your Honor, perhaps the record

should also reflect that the impetus for the plea
agreement is a weakness in the State's evidence in
terms that there was no evidence and is no evidence
that any property cr other thing of value was taken
from the victim there at the res- area.
THE COURT:
MR. KANELL:

Is that correct, Mr. Kanell?
That is correct, Your Honor.

That

is a weakness in the State's case.
THE COURT:

So, in fact, there was no actual

robbery, and your evidence would be basically
circumstantial as to what the intent cf the defendant
was?
PAUL G. MCMULLIN, CSR. RPR

13
MR. KAHELL:

That's correct. Your Honor.

In

fact, the Circuit Court bound over cnly on the issue of
attempted robbery as an aggravated factor.

And in the

plea bargain, I believe it states under the factual
basis, that it was an attempted robbery.
THE COURT:

All right.

Did you understand all

that, Mr. Smith?
MR. SMITH:

Yes, sir.

THE COURT:

Do you have any questions about

MR. SMITH:

No, sir.

THE COURT:

All right.

that?

Mr. Chamberlain, do you

want to make a record with regard to your concerns in
this matter?
MR. CHAMBERLAIN:

Yes, Your Honor.

Ifd like the

record to shew that I represent the family of the
victim.

I've been contacted by them.

Specifically by

Rcwena Hoskins, who is the sister of James Glen Bray,
the victim in this matter..
I've spent a considerable amount of
time —

a considerable amount of time with the

sheriff's office in reviewing records.
it with Mr. Kanell and Mr. Shumate.

I've discussed

Because of their

concern that justice be served, I have —

shortly

before the lunch hour, I learned of the crcocsed plea
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ID

agreement
Mr,

thaz has been stated on the record,

S m i t h would plead to f i r s t - d e g r e e

outlined

on the

murder

51

w i t h h e r , and she has given me a u t h o r i t y

6

the C o u r t

7J

bargain
the

that she is in a g r e e m e n t
is satisfied that —

f a m i l y members —

91

represents

0

Mr*

1

that

2|

offense

Bray,

—

as

record,

I telephoned R o w e n a H c s k i n s ,

and

whereby

that

to indicate

w i t h that

o n behalf

that she h a s

that the —

reviewed

to

plea

of her and

told me

she

that b e i n g the w i f e of

another sister, and a c h i l d of M r . 3ray

—

they are satisfied w i t h a p l e a of guilty to this
and a commitment

they are
41

of a life s e n t e n c e

—

that

satisfied.

T H E COURT:

All right.

T h a n k you,

Mr.

Chamberlain.
6J

MR.

17

CHAMBERLAIN:

T H E COURT:

Thank

you.

I'd like the r e c o r d to reflect

18

prior

191

all c o u n s e l and I discussed

20

bargain —

211

e v e r y o n e w a s aware of what the p r o p o s a l w a s about
before

to taking the bench here

this p r o p o s e d

including Mr. C h a m b e r l a i n

—

so

courtroom,
plea
that

I took the bench.

221
24J

in the open

Well, based u p o n the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s
I'm

going

which

that

to find that there

the plaa may be rested.

made,

is a factual basis upon
And

I'm going to also

PAUL G. MCMULLi::, CSR,
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ADDENDUM

find that this plea is governed by the provisions of
the Alford .decision —

Alford versus North Carolina,

And I'm going to accept it on both of those bases, and
I!m going zo order the plea of guilty entered.
Recommendations regarding sentencing in
the matter?
MR- SHUMATE:

Your Honor, Mr. Smith would ask

the Court to allow him to waive the statutory time and
proceed with sentencing at this time rather than to
order the preparation of a presentence report, in view
of the nature of the plea and the circumstances of the
facts before the Court.
I don't think that the Court sentencing
alternatives are substantial at all, and we're prepared
to go forward with that at this time.
THE COURT:

All right.

Does the State have any

objection?
MR. KANELL:
THE COURT:

The State does not oppose that.
All right.

Mr. Smith, just so

you're clear on this, the law allows you two days
before you're sentenced and up to 30 .days for
sentencing.

And you have the right to take advantage

of that delay if you wish.
Your counsel's indicated that you want to
give up that right and be sentenced today; is that
PAUL G. MCMULLIN, CSR, RPR
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are fully contained in this Statement and in the attached plea
agreement or as supplemented on the record before the Court.
There is reasonable cause to believe the evidence would support
the conviction of the Defendant for the offense (s) for which the
plea(s) are entered and acceptance of the plea(s) would serve the
public interest.

DATED this IHtk day of yy7^~»&^

1988.

LEO G. KANELL
Beaver County Attorney
ORDER
Based

upon

the

facts

set

forth

in

the

foregoing

Statement of Defendant regarding Plea Bargain and the foregoing
Certificates of Counsel, the Court finds the Defendant's plea of
guilty is freely and voluntarily made, and it is so ordered that
the Defendant's pleas of "guilty" to the charge(s) set forth in
the foregoing Statement be accepted and entered.
The foregoing Statement of Defendant was signed before
me this

In

-day of

s/UG%*<>n<skc*~'f 1988.

88cr49
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right?
MR, SMITH:

Yes, sir.

THE COURT:

All right.

You realize than and

I've already told you that if I sentence you today,
it's going to be to the state prison for the rest of
your life.
Do ycu understand that?
MR. SMITH:

Yes, sir.

THE COURT:

And having that in mind, do you

still wish to waive your right to a delay?
MR. SMITH:

Yes, sir.

THE COURT:

All right.

The record will reflect

that waiver.
Does either counsel wish to present
anything before I impose sentence?
Mr. Shumate?
MR. SHUMATE:
THE COURT:

No, Your Honor.
Mr. Smith, do you wish to make a

statement in your own behalf before I impose sentence?
MR. SMITH:

I'm sorry for what happened.

wish, you know, if he cculd feel my apology.

I

I know

that it can't bring him back, but I didn't mean to do
it.
THE COURT:

Anything else?

MR. SMITH:

That's it.

P.

0.

PAUL G. MCMULLIN, CSR, RPR
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CERTIFICATE OF DEFENSE ATTORNEY
I certify

that I am the attorney

for TRACY EUGENE

SMITH, the Defendant above-named, and I know the Defendant has
read the Affidavit or that I have read it to the Defendant; I
have

discussed

it

with

the

Defendant

and

believe

that

the

Defendant fully understands the meaning of its contents and is
mentally and physically competent.

To the best of my knowledge

and belief, after an appropriate investigation, the elements of
the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of the Defendant's criminal
conduct are correctly stated, and these, along with the other
representations and declarations made by the Defendant in the
foregoing Statement are, in all respects, accurate and true.
DATED this /'C/

day of

fytutv^h***

/ 1988.

HUMATE*
ttorney for Defendant
CERTIFICATE 0F./PR0SECUTING ATTORNEY
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah
in

its

reviewed

case

against

TRACY

the

Statement

declarations,

including

of
the

EUGENE
the

SMITH, Defendant.

Defendant

elements

of

and
the

find

I have
that

offense

of

the
the

charge(s) and the factual synopsis of the Defendant's criminal
conduct which constitutes the offense(s) are true and correct.
No improper inducements, threats, or coercions to encourage a
plea have been offered to the Defendant.
-6-

The plea negotiations

THE COURT:

Mr. Kane11, anything?

MR-. XANELL:

Your Honor, pursuant to the plea

agreement, the State does not have any evidence of
aggravating circumstances to present, and the State
does not request the Court to sentence the defendant to
6

the death sentence.

7

THE COURT:

8

MR. XANELL:

9

THE COURT:

10

MR. XANELL:

11

Does not request that?
Does not request that.
All right.
The State requests the Court to

sentence the defendant to life in prison.

12

THE COURT:

12

MR. SHUMATE:

14

THE COURT:

Anything else?
I111 submit it, Your Honor.
All right.

Tracy Eugene Smith,

15

having been convicted by your own plea of the offense

16

of murder in the first-degree, a capital offense, in
violation of the laws of the State of Utah, I now
sentence you to the Utah State Prison for the rest of
your natural life.
I'm also going to make a recommendation to
the board of pardons, which I would like included in
the order, that Mr. Smith serve 20 years before he's
considered to be released from the Utah State Prison.
Anything else?
MR. SHUMATE:

No, Your Honor.

PAUL G. MCMULLIN, CSR, RPR

reduction of the charges for sentencing made or sought by either
defense counsel or the prosecutor are not binding on the Court
and may or may not be approved or followed by the Court.
11.

I am not now under the influence of either drugs

or alcohol.
s^f^S

12. I have read this Statement or I have had it read

to me by my attorney and I have placed my initials beside each
paragraph to indicated that I know and understand its contents.
I am

Jj,/

the

iJ2—

years of age, have attended school through
and I can read and understand the

English Language.

I have discussed its contents with my attorney

and I ask the Court to accept my plea of guilty to the charges
set forth above in this statement because I did, in fact,
(1)

on the 3rd day of October, 1988, intentionally and

knowlingly

c a u s ^ the death of JAMES GLEN BRAY, while

engaged in the commission of an attempted,

aggravated

robbery;
(2) That I did so within Beaver County, State of
Utah.
:an.
DATED this mJj£_~&*y

of //oiye^i^

kt^

1988.

2UGENI SMITH
TRACY EUGENE
Defendant

-5-

THE COURT:

Mr. Kanell, will you prepare the

comnxitnient papers and the judgment?
MR. KANELL;

Would you like -- would it be

appropriate to indicate in the order that a firearm was
used in the commission of the offense?
6|

THE COURT:

Well, there hasn't been a plea taken

7

to that, but I think the factual basis, as we stated

8

it, is clear.

9

Perhaps what I would prefer you do is

10

obtain a copy cf the transcript of today's proceedings,

11

and you may attach that, if you wish, when we send it

12

up to the board of pardons.

12

MR, KANELL:

14

THE COURT:

15

Okay,

Thank you.

All right.

Anything else to be

taken care of?

16

MR, SHUMATE:

17

THE COURT:

IS

No, Your Honor.
Thank you.

Good luck, Mr. Smith.

I need to inform you cf one other matter,

19

Mr. Smith.

You have the right to appeal the decisions

4.01

o*. v»rii3 Ccur«. wC^ny.

21J

run today.

Tna*. r^gn*. v»c appea.*. ceg^ns to

If you want to appeal, you have to file

notice of your intent to appeal with the clerk within
20 days of today's date.
24j

If you fail to do that, you

lose your right to appeal.
Do you understand your right to appeal?

PAUL G. MCMULLIN, CSR, RPR
P. 0. Box 1524 - St. George, Ut. (801) 672-5215

which I have been convicted or to which I have pleaded guilty, my
plea in the present action may result in consecutive sentences
beTng imposed on me.
8.

I know that the fact that I have entered a plea of

guilty does not mean that the Court will not impose either a fine
or sentence of imprisonment upon me and no promises have been
made to me by anyone as to what the sentence will be if I plead
guilty or that it will be made lighter because of my guilty plea.
9.

No one has forced or threatened or coerced me to

obtain my plea of guilty and I am doing so of my own free will
and

after

discussing

it with my

attorney.

I know that any

opinions he may have expressed to me as to what he believes the
Court may do are not binding upon the Court.
sip

10.

No promises of any kind have been made to induce

me to plead guilty except that I have been told that if I do
^>is> plead guilty, the State has agreed
* ^

penalty

and

to

not

present

hearing before the court.
of

guilty

any

to not request

aggravating

the death

evidence

at the

I have also been informed that my plea

to the offense of FIRST DEGREE MURDER,

a capital

offense, is conditional upon the court's imposition of a sentence
of life imprisonment.

I understand that should the court impose

the death penalty, I may withdraw my plea of guilty and require
the State of Utah to go forward with a trial in the matter. I am
also

aware

that

any

charge

or

sentencing

concessions

or

recommendations for probation or suspended sentences, including a
-4-

MR. SMITH:

Yes, sir.

THE COURT:

All right.

Good luck.

(Whereupon the proceedings in the
ibcve-entitled matter were concluded.)
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31
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
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*

* I

IS
10
20
21
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4.

I know that under the Constitutions of Utah and of

the United States I have a right against self-incrimination or a
right- not to give evidence against myself and that this means
that I cannot be compelled to testify in Court upon trial unless
I choose to do so.
AO

5.

I know that under the Constitution of Utah, if I

were tried and convicted by a jury or by the Court, I would have
a right to appeal my conviction and sentence to either the Court
of Appeals or the Supreme Court of Utah for review of the trial
proceedings and that if I could not afford to pay the costs for
such appeal, those costs would be paid by the State without cost
to me and that I would have the right to have the assistance of
counsel on such appeal.
fiS^

6.

I know and understand that by entering a plea of

guilty I am waiving my constitutional rights as set out in the
five

preceding

paragraphs

and

that

I

am,

in

fact,

fully

incriminating myself by admitting that I am guilty of the crimes
to which my plea of guilty is entered.
.H^

7.

I know that under the laws of Utah the maximum

sentence that can and may be imposed upon my plea of guilty to
the charges identified on page one of this affidavit is:
A.

Death or life imprisonment,

and that the imprisonment may be for consecutive periods if my
plea is to more than one charge.

I also know that if I am on

probation, parole or awaiting sentencing upon another offense of
-3-

II
21

C E R T I F I C A T E
STATE OF UTAH

)
) S3 •

COUNTY OF WASHINGTON )
41

I, PAUL G. MCMULLIN, CSR, RPR, a Notary

5

Public, in and for the County of Washington, State of

6

Utah, do hereby certify:

7J

That, the foregoing matter, to wit,
STATE OF UTAH VS. TRACY EUGENE SMITH, CRIMINAL NO. 621,

Ol

was taken down by ma in shorthand at the time and place

10

therein named and thereafter reduced to computerized

11

transcription under my direction.

12

I further testify that I am not interested

12
14

in the event of the action.
WITNESS my hand and seal this 22rd day of

15 J

December, 198S.

16
17
18
191
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RESIDING AT: S t .

George,

Utah
<

MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: 6-17-91

'A

>

*•>

—
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1.

I know that I have constitutional rights under the

Constitutions of Utah and the United States to plead not guilty
and to have a jury trial upon the charges to which I have entered
a plea of guilty or to a trial by the Court should I elect to
waive

a

trial by

jury.

I know

that

I have a right to be

represented by counsel and that I am in fact represented by JAMES
L. SHUMATE as my attorney.
2.

I know that if I wish to have a trial upon the

charges, I have a right to be confronted by the witnesses against
me by having them testify, in open court, in my presence and
before the Court and jury and that I have the right to have those
witnesses cross-examined by my attorney.
the right to have witnesses

subpoenaed

I also know that I have
by the State, at its

expense, to testify in Court upon my behalf and that I could, if
I elected to do so, testify in Court upon my own behalf and that,
if I choose not to do so, the jury can and will be told that this
fact may not be held against me if I choose to have the jury so
instructed.
3.

I know that if I were to have a trial, the State

must prove each and every element of the crime charged to the
satisfaction of the Court or jury beyond a reasonable doubt; that
I would have no obligation to offer any evidence myself and that
any verdict rendered by a jury, whether it be that of guilty or
not guilty, must be by unanimous agreement of all jurors.

-2-
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LEO G. KANELL
Beaver County Attorney
Attorney for Plaintiff
P. 0. Box 471
Beaver, Utah 84713
Telephone: 438-2351
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BEAVER, STATE OF UTAH

STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT
REGARDING PLEA BARGAIN,
CERTIFICATES OF COUNSEL,
AND ORDER

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff
vs.

Criminal No. 631

TRACY EUGENE SMITH,
Defendant.

STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT REGARDING PLEA AGREEMENT
I, TRACY EUGENE SMITH, the above-named Defendant, under
oath, hereby acknowledge that I have entered a plea of guilty to
the charge of MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE, a capital offense, as
contained

in

the

Information

on

file

against

me

in

the

above-entitled Court, a copy of which I have received, and I
understand the charge to which this plea of guilty is entered is
a capital felony and that I am entering such plea voluntarily and
of my own free will after conferring with my attorney, JAMES L.
SHUMATE,

and

with

the

knowledge

and

understanding

of

the

following facts:

W

CRAIG S. COOK, No. 713
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
3645 East 3100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
Telephone: 48 5-8123

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

TRACY EUGENE SMITH,
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION
TO RESPONDENTS1 MOTION
TO DISMISS HABEAS PETITIC

Petitioner,
vs •
HANK GALETKA, North Point Warden,
UTAH STATE PRISON and THE
STATE OF UTAH,

No. 920553

Respondents.

This Memorandum is written in opposition to Respondents'
Motion to Dismiss the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed on
December 18, 1992.
The State has distorted the factual record in this case as
well as applicable case law, and has failed to correctly analyze
the facts and legal principles as they apply to this case.

For

these reasons, therefore, Petitioner is compelled to respond to
its Memorandum.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The State attempts to argue that Petitioner in December of
1988 had the opportunity of filing a direct appeal in this matter
and did not do so.

The State has left out, however, several
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important facts.

For example, the State makes the following

quotation:
Petitioner therein stated that he had been
assured by his attorney Hthat a timely notice of
appeal would be filed with this Court, base[d] upon
but not limited to effective assistance of counsel."
(R. 69). (Respondent's Memorandum, at 2 ) .
Respondents conveniently left out the last sentence that
Petitioner wrote following that quoted by the respondents.

It

stated, MThat counsel did not fully investigate the facts of the
case at bar that could have proven the defendant's innocence."
(R.

69). Thus, contrary to the State's repeated assertions, any

mention of ineffective counsel in this prior motion had nothing
whatsoever to do with the proceedings of the guilty plea but
instead concerned a claim that counsel failed to investigate the
facts of the killing.
A second serious omission concerns the facts and
circumstances relating to the "notice of belated appeal." On
January 27, 1989 the Clerk of this Court sent a notice to the
Beaver County Clerk that a notice of appeal had been filed in
Case No.

890027 (R.

74). On March 20, 1989 a hearing was held

before the Honorable J. Philip Eves.

Defendant was once again

represented by his court-appointed attorney, James L. Shumate.
If the question of this appeal becomes relevant, Petitioner would
proffer that in his conversations with Mr. Shumate he was
informed that he could not raise any claim of ineffectiveness of
counsel on appeal and that therefore he should go into the
Federal court and file a habeas corpus action if he was unhappy
with Mr. Shumate's performance concerning the investigation.
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The

-3A life sentence for capital murder is an indeterminate sentence modifiable by the
Board of Pardons. Otherwise the Court's recommendation of 20 years before parole would
be irrelevant and meaningless and this Motion would never have been made. It is evident
that the Utah Legislature considers a life sentence for capital murder as an indeterminate
sentence, since it has enacted, since the sentencing in this case, a new possible sentence in
such cases, life without possibility of parole. (See 76-3-201 UCA)
The defendant's Motion is denied. The sentence in his case was not illegal as he
complains.
DATED this

P "~day of July 1996.

^*»»>^

Minute Entry substantiates Petitioner's claim by the following
statement:
This matter was called on for hearing at the
request of the defendant. Mr. Shumate informed and
the defendant concurred that the motion be voluntarily
withdrawn. Mr. Shumate stated that the defendant will
pursue his requested relief in the Federal court
system. The appeal was ordered withdrawn. (R. 86).
The motion to withdraw the guilty plea was filed on December
4, 1991 by the petitioner pro se.

His sole grounds for the

petition was that there was insufficient evidence to charge him
with first degree murder.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THIS PETITION IS NOT PROCEDURALLY BARRED
SINCE PETITIONER COULD NOT HAVE BROUGHT
HIS INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE CLAIM IN HIS
PRIOR MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA.
The State argues that since Petitioner did not raise the
ineffectiveness of counsel in his motion to withdraw the guilty
plea he is now barred from raising it in this habeas corpus
action.

The State cites the case of Garrish v. Barnes as

standing for the proposition "a motion to withdraw a guilty plea
is a prior post-conviction proceeding for procedural bar
purposes." Again, the State completely distorts the status of
Utah law.

In Garrish this Court held that Garrish was

procedurally barred by failing to raise the issue of the breached
plea bargain on appeal from the denial of the motion to withdraw
the guilty plea.

This Court did not hold that the motion to

withdraw the guilty plea precluded a subsequent habeas corpus
action.

-3-

-2the position, citing no authority supporting his view, that a life sentence is not an
indeterminate sentence.
The Court now holds that the position of the defendant is incorrect under the Utah
sentencing scheme. In fact a life sentence for Murder, a capital felony, is an indeterminate
sentence. Therefore the sentence is not illegal.
Under Utah's sentencing scheme, all commitments to prison are considered
indeterminate sentences unless otherwise provided by law. (77-18-4 UCA) Utah's
Constitution and statutes provide for a Board of Pardons which body is charged with the
authority and responsibility of determining whether a sentence will be fully served, modified,
or terminated. (See 77-27-5 UCA; Andrus v. Turner. 590 P.2d 363; Raslins v. Holden. 869
P-2d 958.)
The Board of Pardons has unfettered discretion in carrying out its function and its
decisions are not subject to judicial scrutiny, except in limited cases.
An indeterminate sentence is one fixed by the sentencing authority (the Court) as a
maximum sentence or within a possible minimum/maximum range, understanding that the
actual time to be serve will be later determined by another entity, the Board of Pardons.1
The alternative plan, determinate sentencing, is used in some states and jurisdictions. Under
determinate sentencing the Court fixes the exact number of years, months or days to be
served by the defendant and no other entity has authority to require more or less, as long as
the sentence is legally permissible. This is not Utah's approach to sentencing.

'See Mutart v. Pratt. 170 P.67; State v. Empev. 239 P.25; Lee Lim v. Davis, 284
P.232.

Counsel has read the Garrish case several times and has been
unable to find anywhere in the opinion that a motion to withdraw
a guilty plea is considered a prior post-conviction proceeding in
relation to habeas corpus petitions.

Rule 20, for example, of

the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure only requests a "statement
indicating whether any other petition for a writ of habeas corpus
based upon the same or similar grounds has been filed and the
reason why relief was denied.

(Rule 20(c)(3)),

The issues in a motion to withdraw a guilty plea and a
habeas corpus action can be quite distinct.

In the motion to

withdraw action, the question is whether the defendant made a
knowing plea or whether the State and the Court breached its
agreement with the defendant.

In many cases involving guilty

plea motions no claim whatsoever is made of ineffectiveness of
counsel.

Likewise, a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel in a

habeas corpus action may have nothing whatsoever to do with the
entry of the guilty plea.

It is for this reason that two

post-conviction remedies cannot be used as procedural bars in the
sense of two successive petitions for habeas corpus.
The distinction in Garrish and the instant case is
remarkable.

Garrish was convicted of child abuse and was

ultimately sentenced to a minimum mandatory term of six years to
life.

During the proceedings he was represented by three

separate attorneys.

Here, Petitioner, who was 21 years old at

the time of the conviction, was represented by only one attorney
and was sentenced to life imprisonment with a twenty-year
recommendation of imprisonment.

This recommendation is now being
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The defendant, Tracy Eugene Smith, entered a plea of guilty to the crime of Murder
in the First Degree, a capital felony, on November 14, 1988. The Court sentenced him to
serve a life sentence and recommended to the Board of Pardons that he serve at least 20
years before being allowed parole. The defendant has since filed at least one appeal and
several petitions for extraordinary relief.
On May 15, 1996, the defendant caused to be filed a "Motion for an Order of Court
Correcting a Sentence that was Imposed in an Illegal Manner." The defendant moves the
Court to correct or modify the sentence given by deleting the Court's recommendation'that
the defendant serve 20 years before being paroled. The defendant correctly argues that the
Court can correct an illegal sentence at any time. (See Rule 22, Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure.)
The alleged illegality raised by the defendant is that the Court sentenced the defendant
to a life sentence and then made a recommendation pursuant to 77-27-13(5) UCA. The
defendant argues that the Court acted illegally because that statutory provision, by its own
terms, applies only to cases where an "indeterminate sentence is imposed," Defendant takes

followed by the Board of Pardons.
Garrish involved (1) a direct appeal, (2) a full evidentiary
hearing as to a subsequent motion to withdraw the guilty plea,
(3) an appeal from that denial; (4) three separate habeas corpus
actions; and (5) an appeal from the denial of t:he third habeas
corpus petition.

In contrast to this abundance of judicial

procedure in Garrish, the petitioner in this case did not file
any direct appeal from his entry of guilty plea based upon the
advice of his court-appointed attorney, James Shumate.

Appearing

pro se, Petitioner filed a motion to withdraw the guilty plea but
no evidentiary hearing was held.

The Court ordered the dismissal

of the motion based solely upon the record.

It was not until the

proceedings before this Court with Petitioner's new
court-appointed attorney that the present claims in the direct
appeal and habeas corpus action have been made.

This blemished

legal process supports the contention of Justice Zimmerman in
Garrish that counsel should be provided in a thorough post
conviction proceeding and appeal.
Clearly, Petitioner was not previously aware of the
ineffectiveness of counsel in sentencing now being asserted in
the habeas corpus action filed in this court.

The State's

repeated reference that he was aware of such a claim four years
earlier is a complete distortion of the record.

(Respondents1

Brief at 4 ) . His earlier statement in his affidavit concerning
his counsel's failure to investigate the facts of the crime
certainly does not preclude an ineffectiveness claim being made
as to his counsel's performance during the guilty plea proceeding

-5-
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itself.
In failing to file a direct appeal, Petitioner cannot be
held accountable for listening to the advice of the
court-appointed attorney who is now being accused of being
ineffective.

Fernandez v. Cook, 783 P.2d 547 (Utah 1989).

In

addition, this Court has held that the writ of habeas corpus is a
flexible protection to protect against the denial of a
constitutional right in a criminal conviction and that the "good
cause" requirement is justified for a number of reasons including
the existence of fundamental unfairness in a conviction*

Hearst

v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029 (Utah 1989).
Accordingly, this petition is not procedurally barred and
must not be dismissed.
POINT II
THIS PETITION SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED
UNDER HILL V. LOCKHART.
The State next argues that under Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S.
52 (1985) Petitioner has failed to allege sufficient prejudice to
allow this matter to proceed.

This claim is broken by the State

into two parts: first, the assertion by Petitioner that his
counsel failed to inform him as to the twenty-year sentence
recommendation or that the judge could make such a
recommendation; and second, the other matters concerning
counsel's representation during the guilty plea proceeding.
These parts will now be addressed sequentially.
The Hill v. Lockhart case, contrary to the State's
assertion, is not identical "in all material respects to the case
at bar." In Hill the petitioner claimed his attorney failed to
-6-
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Defendant has had repeated opportunities to raise this issue, including a prior motion to
withdraw his plea. There is no new evidence alleged by defendant. The limitations period for
post-conviction relief has passed. (See 78-35a-107 UCA)
Pursuant to Rule 65B(5), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, this court now finds that this
motion is frivolous, repetitive and without merit. In addition, it is unsupported by the records
of the plea.
Accordingly for the reasons set out above, the Motion is denied.
DATED this 21st day of August 1997.

properly advise him as to his eligibility for parole under the
sentence agreed to in the plea bargain.

The Supreme Court held

that neither Arkansas nor Federal law required that petitioner be
informed of his parole eligibility date prior to pleading guilty.
The Court stated:
We have never held that the United States
Constitution requires the State to furnish a defendant
with information about parole eligibility in order for
the defendant's plea of guilty to be voluntary, and
indeed such a constitutional requirement would be
inconsistent with the current rules of procedure
governing the entry of guilty pleas in the Federal
court- 474 U.S. at 56.
In the instant case, the information which was omitted by
Petitioner's counsel was not that of parole but was that of
sentencing.

Numerous cases hold that matters affecting the

sentence of a defendant allow withdrawal of a guilty plea if all
elements and facts and circumstances are not fully explained.
See State v. Smith, 776 P.2d 929 (Utah 1989); State v, Copeland,
765 P.2d 1266 (Utah 1988); State v. West, 765 P.2d 891 (Utah
1988); State v. Vasilacopulous, 756 P,2d 92 (Utah App.
1988).
Once again, the State has distorted the record by failing to
complete the quotation cited in Respondents' memorandum.

The

State makes the following assertion:
In his affidavit he states under oath, "Had I
known that the judge was going to make this kind of
recommendation I don't know whether I would have
entered this plea or not... (Respondents' Memorandum
at 7) .
The State omitted the following subsequent language of that
sentence, "since the state had very weak evidence concerning the
attempt to rob Mr. Bray."

(Affidavit at 18).
-7-
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Section 78-35a-109 UCA requires the court to consider two factors in deciding whether
to appoint pro bono counsel. The court has considered those factors. This case raises only
one issue, ie: whether the defendant can withdraw his plea of guilty. Defendant alleges that
this court failed to comply with the provisions of Rule 11, U.R.Crim.P. There is no need for
an evidentiary hearing as the issues can be decided from the transcripts and records of the
taking of the plea. In addition, in view of the provisions of 78-35a-106 UCA and 78-35a-107
UCA, this court will be dismissing and denying the Motion because the Statute of Limitations
period has passed and the claim raised by the defendant in this motion was raised and
addressed in previous appeal proceedings, or should have been, or was raised and addressed in
previous post conviction relief proceedings, or should have been.
The issues do not appear complicated and there is no need for an evidentiary hearing.
Thus the appointment of pro bono counsel is not warranted.
The petitioner's Motion for Appointment of Legal Counsel is denied.

MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA AND CORRECT ILLEGAL SENTENCE
On August 4, 1997, Mr. Smith filed a Notice to Submit for Decision and Request for
Hearing on his most recent motion to withdraw the guilty plea. The Court declines to set the
matter for oral argument. The Court has read the Motion submitted by Mr. Smith and the
affidavits included herewith. Mr. Smith challenges the entry of the plea in this case on the
grounds that he was not advised that the recommendations of the prosecution and his own
attorney were not binding upon the Court.

The Lockhart case acknowledged that in many instances an
inquiry of "prejudice" will depend on likelihoods of various
circumstances and how they would have most probably affected the
outcome of a trial or plea.

Petitioner was entitled to be

informed of all available pertinent information concerning
sentencing.

By not being given this information he was clearly

prejudiced as a matter of law by being unable to make a knowing
and voluntary decision.

If he stated today that he would not

have entered the plea had he known this twenty-year
recommendation would be made, such a statement would be
meaningless since the inquiry in these type of cases is at the
time the guilty plea was made.

The failure to correctly advise a

defendant as to pertinent sentencing information creates
automatic prejudice regardless of what outcome a defendant may
have chosen had he been correctly advised.
The second portion of the argument made by the State is
equally absurd.

The State claims that the petition never alleges

that but for counsel's errors the judge would have made a
different recommendation or no recommendation at all.
(Respondents' Brief at 8 ) . This statement is simply not true.
As noted in the Memorandum of Points and Authorities which was
incorporated by reference in the habeas corpus petition, "had
Petitioner's appointed counsel been effective the twenty-year
recommendation made by the lower court at the conclusion of the
sentencing proceeding may well not have been made." (Petitioner's
Memorandum of Points and Authorities at 2 ) . Moreover, Petitioner
devoted seven pages of his Memorandum to showing the prejudice
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determination was appealed. On April 3, 1997, the Court of Appeals issued a Memorandum
Opinion upholding the decision of the trial court.
In addition Mr. Smith filed in the 3rd-District Court the case of Smith v. Galetka. Case
No. 930900217, which was a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. In that case Mr. Smith
raised additional claims as to the propriety of the taking of his plea. The trial court ruled
against Mr. Smith in that case, and Mr. Smith did not appeal.

MOTION TO APPOINT LEGAL COUNSEL
On July 28, 1997, Mr. Smith filed yet another Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea and
Correct Illegal Sentence. He now seeks to have this Court appoint counsel to represent him
and proposes to require the County of Beaver to pay the costs of that Motion and the
subsequent proceedings.
Under the provisions of 78-35a-101 UCA, et. Seq.. the Court has authority only to
appoint pro bono counsel. There is no provision for appointments paid by the county where
the conviction occurred.
This Court apparently has discretion as to whether or not to appoint counsel. (See 7835a-109 UCA) Although this is a serious case for the petitioner in view of the long period of
confinement which he is undergoing, the Court is of the opinion that Mr. Smith has had
several opportunities to raise the issues which he thought were appropriate relating to his entry
of his plea of guilty in this case. The Court can see no reason to appoint counsel in this case
and hereby declines to do so.

which occurred or could have occurred because of counsel's
conduct during the sentencing proceedings.

See Petitioner's

Memorandum at 10-16.
The State wishes Petitioner to be a fortune teller.

The

State wishes Petitioner to allege what the judge woud have done
had Petitioner's attorney presented the information to him as he
should have done under an effective counsel standard.

Petitioner

submits that there is a reasonable probability that the conduct
of his counsel undermined the confidence in the outcome of the
sentencing recommendation.

Again, Petitioner was entitled to

present reliable information to the court as part of his
constitutional sentencing rights.

Whether the judge would have

done anything differently after this material had been presented
is not the question.

It is the failure to present this material

which is the crux of this petition.

In the context of a trial

setting, it cannot be said that the complete failure of Mr.
Shumate to present any evidence or arguments in the sentencing
hearing was "harmless error."
The State also wishes Petitioner to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the twenty-year recommendation made by the
court conclusively caused the twenty-year sentence imposed by the
Board of Pardons.

This kind of proof is not required here.

The

mere coincidence of the twenty-year term in both proceedings
establishes a "reasonable probability" that the judge's
recommendation was followed by the Board of Pardons.
The State, in summary, is attempting to use technicalities
to escape a clear case of possible injustice.
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This matter came before the Court this date on the petitioner's Motion and Order for
Appointment of Legal Counsel. The petitioner moves the Court for appointment of legal
counsel to be paid by Beaver County and to pursue petitioner's most recent motion to
withdraw his plea.
The defendant was convicted of murder upon his plea of guilty on November 14, 1988.
Thereafter in December 1991, the defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea after
having lost his direct appeal rights by inaction. The Court denied the request to withdraw the
guilty plea and the matter was pursued by appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah.
On December 27, 1993, the Supreme Court issued its opinion addressing the claims raised by
the defendant, including the letter written by this Court to the Board of Pardons recommending
that the defendant serve at least 20 years. The trial court's denial of the Motion to Withdraw
the plea was upheld. Thereafter the defendant herein filed a motion for an order of the Court
correcting the sentence which Mr. Smith claimed was illegal. The Court issued a
Memorandum Opinion on July 19, 1996, in which the defendant's motion was denied. That

to weigh probabilities and "what ifs" then an evidentiary hearing
should be held so that factual findings can be made concerning
these predictions and probability assessments.

Petitioner would

assert, however, that the record on its face clearly shows that
he was denied effective representation of counsel by the complete
failure to meet the standards of an attorney representing a
defendant in a capital murder case in which a substantial
sentence is extremely possible.
For these reasons, therefore, this matter should be set for
hearing either on the merits or remanded for an evidentiary
hearing to answer any of the questions that are pertinent to this
petition.
DATED this 28th day of December, 1992.

Craig S. C6ok
Attorney for Petitioner
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing to J. Frederic Voros, Jr., Assistant Attorney
General, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
this 28th day of December, 1992.
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Id., quoting Hurst v. Cook. 777 P.2d 1029, 1036 (Utah 1989). This Court finds that the
present motion merely recited those arguments made by Defendant on other occasions, and
represents an attempt to keep his case alive indefinitely. As such, it was within this Court's
discretion to dismiss the present motion without including findings of fact or conclusions of
law.
14. Based on the foregoing, Defendant's Motion of Reconsideration of Defendant's
Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea and Correct Illegal Sentence is DENIED.

Dated at Parowan, Utah this

Z day of September, 1997.
BY THE COURT:

g<f^ys^L

GE J.IPHIL^EVES

s.

January 13, 1994
Honorable David S. Young
Third District Court
240 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Re:

Tracy Eugene Smith v. Hank Galetka, et al.
Case No. 93-0900217HC

Dear Judge Young:
I have recently completed an extensive review of this case
together with the decision rendered last month by the Utah
Supreme Court. Unfortunately, because of various procedural
difficulties which have occurred in this case, I am at a loss as
to how to proceed. For this reason, I would request a conference
with counsel in order to have the opportunity to determine how to
proceed in the future.
In order to allow the Court and counsel an insight into my
concerns I offer the following. At the conclusion of the hearing
in this case you ordered that Ms. Micklos prepare Findings in
support of your judgment. I was to be sent the Findings for my
approval as to form. Accordingly, Ms. Micklos sent me her
proposed Findings and in order to try to expedite this case I
sent to her my proposed changes to her Findings and Conclusions
on November 3, 1993. On November 9 she sent me a letter stating
she could not accept these changes and that the Findings would
therefore be submitted to.
I assumed that my objections were also included with her
Findings but I do not know if they were or not. In any event, on
November 22 the Court executed the Findings and Judgment. On
November 29 I sent this Court a letter stating that I was not
sure if my objections had been received and therefore enclosed a
copy of my objections for consideration. At that time I did not
know that the Court had already executed the Findings and Order.
On December 14 this Court issued a Minute Entry declining to
sing the requested Findings offered by me but finding that the
Court disagreed with portions of two of the findings and

10. The burden of satisfying the first prong weighs heavily against the Defendant.
"To prevail on the first prong, a petitioner must overcome a strong presumption that counsel
rendered adequate assistance." IcL (citations omitted). This requires the Defendant to
demonstrate specific instances where counsel acted or failed to act in a manner which does
not meet an objective standard of reasonableness. M- (citations omitted). Importantly, courts
reviewing an attorney's performance will grant "counsel wide latitude to make tactical
decisions and will not question such decisions unless . . . [there is] fno reasonable basis1 for
them." Id., quoting Fernandez v. Cook. 870 P.2d 870, 876 (Utah 1993).
11. In the present case, defense counsel addressed the Court with regard to the
weaknesses in the State's case against the Defendant. At that time, defense counsel stated
that, in light of the fact that Defendant's co-defendant was involved in a criminal case arising
out of the same incident, and that testimony might be elicited in that case which would
implicate the Defendant in a robbery offense, it was advisable for the Defendant to accept the
terms of the plea. When taking the co-defendant's criminal case into consideration, and the
possibility that Defendant faced a death sentence if his case had resulted in a jury trial, it is
the opinion of this Court that defense counsel's advice that Defendant sign the plea agreement
had a reasonable basis which does not reflect ineffective assistance of counsel.
12. As this Court has determined Defendant failed to satisfy the first prong required
to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, it will not reach the issue of whether Defendant
satisfied the second prong. Therefore, this Court finds that the Defendant has failed to set
forth any new facts or present any other reason which would warrant providing relief from
this Court's August 21, 1997 decision.
13. In conclusion, this Court would direct Defendant's attention to the Court's
finding in the August 21, 1997 Memorandum of Points and Authorities, wherein the Court
determined that Defendant's motion was frivolous, repetitive and without merit pursuant to
U.R.C.P. 65(B)(5). This Court would also direct Defendant's attention to the case Wright v.
Carver. 886 P.2d 58, 60 (Utah 1994), which held:
"A ground for relief from a conviction or sentence that has once been fully and
fairly adjudicated on appeal or in a prior habeas proceeding should not be
readjudicated unless it can be shown that there are 'unusual circumstances.' . . .This
rule was fashioned to prevent abuse by prisoners who burden the courts and
frustrate the ends of justice by trying to keep cases alive indefinitely.'"

conclusions which had in fact been executed. The Court stated,
"The Findings entered may remain with these adjustments."
On December 27, 1993 the Supreme Court in Case No. 92-0141
affirmed the lower court's denial of Mr. Smith's Motion to
Withdraw his guilty plea and discussed the issue that was raised
for the first time on appeal concerning Appellant's claim that
tftzr lower court had insufficient evidence in order to make a
twenty year recommendation of a sentence. Because this issue was
raised for the first time on appeal, the Supreme Court refused to
hear it. The Court stated, "However, the District Court may
address the issue of the twenty-year recommendation in Smith's
pending Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus."
These procedural events, as seems to be typical of this
case, cannot be readily classified under our rules of civil
procedure. I view them as follows: The state submitted proposed
Findings to the Court which had not been approved as to form by
myself. Through a misunderstanding I assumed that my objections
had been filed concurrently but apparently they were not. This
Court, based upon no objections,, entered the Findings on November
22.
No official notice was sent to me that the Judgment had been
entered in accordance with Rule 58A(d). Nevertheless, I sent to
this Court my proposed changes and additions to the Findings
submitted by the State. This letter and proposed Findings was
essentially a motion under Rule 52 or Rule 59 requesting an
amendment of the Findings and Judgment.
The Minute Entry of December 14, in my view, was therefore a
decision denying the requested changes except for two specific
Findings. The Minute Entry, however, is not a final order for
any purpose and thus an order needs to be prepared officially
amending the previously-entered Findings.
Since a final judgment has not been entered in this case
Rule 59 would allow Petitioner to file a Motion to Open the
Judgment to take additional evidence, if necessary, as to the
issue that has been referred to this Court by the Utah Supreme
Court.
After this Court enters a decision as to the "judge's
recommendation issue", then the entire matter could be finalized
if an order which then could be appealable to the Supreme Court
in Petitioner desires.
While I acknowledge that this above scenario is open to
debate, I believe that this is the precise reason that a
conference should be held in order to discuss the most prudent
way of proceeding to avoid any further road blocks to completing
this case. I would be most happy to schedule a conference with
the Court and with Ms. Micklos at any time during the next four
weeks.

the purpose behind this rule is to ensure defendants are guaranteed their constitutional rights.
7. However, this Court would also point out that the provision at issue affords
protection only if sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court. In the case at hand,
the Defendant was charged with a capital offense, the criminal penalties for which are
statutorily designated as either the death penalty or life imprisonment. U.C.A. § 76-3-207(4),
(6) (1996). In addition, the parties had entered into a conditional plea agreement which
expressly provided that Defendant would be sentenced to life imprisonment rather than face
the potentiality of a death sentence in a trial by jury. Therefore, according to the statute, and
the plea arrangement agreed to by the parties, the term of Defendant's sentence was not an
issue at the time of sentencing.
8. At the time the Defendant entered his plea, this Court asked counsel if they had
any recommendations regarding sentencing. This question, taken out of context, may be what
has confused the Defendant and led him to believe that some violation of his Rule 11 rights
was violated. However, when taken in context, the question was asked and responded to in
light of Defendant's right to delay the imposition of sentencing for a period of thirty days.
Counsel for the Defendant responded by saying that the Defendant desired to waive that time,
and that a presentence report was unnecessary in light of the nature of the plea. Therefore,
this Court does not find merit in Defendant's claim that the Court erred by violating
Defendant's Rule 11 protections.
9. With respect to Defendant's claim that he received ineffective assistance of
counsel at the time he entered his plea, this Court agrees with Defendant's interpretation of
U.C.A. § 78-35a-106(2), insofar as the statute permits individuals challenging a conviction or
sentence to seek relief on grounds they received ineffective assistance of counsel, and that this
claim is exempt from the statute of limitations period governing appeals. However,! this
Court would add that, in order to establish that he was poorly represented, the Defendant
must satisfy a two-prong test:
First, a petitioner must show "that his counsel rendered a deficient performance in
some demonstrable manner, which performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonable professional judgment." . . .Second, a petition must show that his
counsel's performance prejudiced him.
Tavlor v. Warden. 905 P.2d 277, 282 (Utah 1995); quoting Bundv v. Deland. 763 P.2d 803,
805 (Utah 1988).
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Capitol Bldg.
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not timely, in that the applicable statute of limitations period had expired for bringing forward
such motions. (Id. at p. 3)
3. Defendant claimed he was not advised that the recommendations made by the
prosecutor and defense counsel were not binding on the Court, and that such knowledge
would have altered the outcome. This Court declined to grant Defendant's motion on this
claim on grounds that the Defendant failed to present new evidence, and that the statute of
limitations period had expired for that relief as well. (Id. at pp. 3-4)
4. Defendant's present motion requests a reconsideration of that prior order.
The Defendant primarily focuses on two different claims. First, the Defendant claims that he
was inadequately represented by counsel at the time the plea agreement was entered on the
record, in that the State would be unable to establish that Defendant had the requisite intent to
commit the crime in a trial on the matter, which defense counsel failed to properly consider.
Second, the Defendant claims that this Court committed error in failing to advise the
Defendant that any sentencing recommendations agreed upon by the prosecution and defense
counsel were not binding on the Court.
5. As a preliminary matter, this Court finds that the rules of civil procedure do not
include a provision for motions for reconsideration. See Ron Shepherd Ins.. Inc. v. Shields.
882 P.2d 650 (Utah 1994). However, it has been the practice of some courts to address
motions which have been so titled as if they had been filed pursuant to an applicable rule. See
Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa & Son. 808 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1991). This Court finds that
Defendant's motion finds some applicability with Rule 60 of the rules of civil procedure,
which provides for relief from a judgment or order. A motion for relief from a judgment or
order may be granted by a court to provide relief from a final judgment, order, or proceeding
under certain circumstances, including but not limited to the discovery of new evidence, or
any other reason justifying relief. U.R.C.P. 60(b) (1997).
6. With respect to Defendant's claim that this Court failed to properly advise
according to U.R.Cr.P. 11(g)(2), this Court finds that this rule provides the following:
If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court shall advise the
defendant personally that any recommendation as to sentence is not binding on the
court.
This Court agrees that, in accordance with the decision State v. Gibbons. 740 P.2d 1309
(Utah 1987), courts are required to strictly comply with the provisions of Rule 11, and that
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
BEAVER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

vs.

CASE NO. 631
JUDGE J. PHILIP EVES

TRACY EUGENE SMITH,
Defendant.

The above-captioned matter came before this Court on Defendant's Motion of
Reconsideration of Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea and Correct Illegal Sentence.
The Defendant moves this Court to reconsider the decision executed August 21, 1997,
wherein the Court denied Plaintiffs Motion and Order for Appointment of Legal Counsel.
This Court has reviewed Defendant's motion, as well as the Court's previous decisions on
similar motions. Having reviewed the file, having reviewed the applicable law, and deeming
itself fully advised in the premises, the Court now makes the following findings and
conclusions:
1. On November 14 1988, the Defendant was convicted of murder pursuant to the
entry of a guilty plea. What followed thereafter were numerous attempts, both to this Court
and to the state appellate courts, on the part of the Defendant to have this guilty plea
withdrawn and have the matter set for trial. In all such instances, this Court denied
Defendant's motions, which denials were affirmed by the appellate courts.
2. Following Defendant's July 28, 1997 Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea and
Correct liiegal Sentence, wherein Defendant requested the Court to appoint legal counsel and
requested that his guilty plea be withdrawn and his sentence be "corrected," this Court issued
a decision denying Defendant's motion. At that time, this Court held that, though it was
within its discretion to appoint counsel on a pro bono basis, that Defendant's petition neither
contained factual allegations necessitating an evidentiary hearing, nor did it involve
complicated issues of law or fact requiring the assistance of counsel. Therefore, this Court
declined to appoint legal counsel on Defendant's behalf, pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-36-109
(1996). (Mem. of P. & A., pp. 2-3) This Court further found that Defendant's motion was
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STEWART, Justice:
Tracy Eugene Smith pleaded guilty to first degree
murder. He was charged with intentionally causing the death of
another while engaged in the commission of or an attempt to
commit robbery or aggravated robbery. See Utah Cede Ann.
§ 76-5-202(1) (d) . The trial court sentenced him to life
imprisonment and recommended that "the Defendant not be allowed
parole or even be considered for parole until he has served at
least Twenty (20) years."
On December 4, 1991, Smith moved to withdraw his guilty
plea on the ground that the trial court could not have reasonably
accepted a guilty plea for capital murder because Smith had
denied that he was attempting to rob the victim at the time of
the murder. On February 24, 1992, the trial court denied the
motion to withdraw the guilty plea. Smith filed a notice of
appeal'from that ruling on March 20, 1992. Subsequently, on
December 4, 1992, Smith filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus in this Court, alleging that he had received ineffective
assistance of counsel during the sentencing proceeding. On
January 5, 1993, this Court referred the habeas petition to the
Third District Court, where it is currently pending.
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Counsel was appointed to represent Smith on his appeal
from the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
Counsel states in his brief for defendant:
After review of the record appellate counsel
concluded that the lower court was absolutely
correct in its ruling. Since Mr. Miller [a
co-defendant] was purportedly ready to
testify as to the intention of robbing the
victim there is no question but that a jury
could have believed Millers testimony and
[could] have found Defendant guilty of
capital murder. The argument that Defendant
made to the .Tower court was simply without
merit.
Initially, counsel considered filing an
Anders brief allowing Defendant to argue his
position in spite of counsel's belief to the
contrary. Appellate counsel has spoken [at]
length with Defendant at the Utah State
Prison and is now able to represent that
Defendant concurs in this assessment and
therefore withdraws any appeal based upon the
grounds previously raised below.
Counsel further states that under State v. Clavton, 639
P.2d 168 (Utah 1981), and State v. Gabaldon# 735 P.2d 410 (Utah
Ct. App. 1987), an attorney representing a criminal defendant on
appeal may withdraw only if he finds the case to be wholly
frivolous but that "the present situation is somewhat of a
hybrid. The grounds raised by the defendant are clearly
frivolous and cannot be supported. On the other hand, grounds
that were not raised by the defendant below are, in the opinion
of counsel, meritorious and deserve consideration by some
reviewing court.1' We agree that other evidence of Smith's intent
to rob existed and that tne trial court properly denied the
motion to withdraw the guilty plea.
The issue that appellate counsel urges us to address
for the first time on appeal is whether the trial court erred in
entering a twenty-year recommendation of incarceration with
respect to Smith's prison sentence. Counsel asserts that there
was no factual record before the trial court justifying that
recommendation. We refuse to address the issue.
It is black-letter law that an appellate court will not
address issues raised for the first time on appeal except in
extraordinary circumstances that do not exist here. Oner Int'l,
Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 455 (Utah 1993); State v.
Allen, 839 P.2d 291, 302 (Utah 1992); State v. Stecrcrell, 660 P.2d
252, 254 (Utah 1983). However, the district court may address
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the issue of the twenty-year recommendation in Smith's pending
petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Affirmed.

WE CONCUR:

Gordon R. Hall, Chie f Justice

Richard C. Howe, Associate
Chief Justice

Christine M. Durham, Justice

Michael D. Zimmerman, Justice
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Counsel was appointed to represent Smith on his appeal
from the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
Counsel states in his brief for defendant:
After review of the record appellate counsel
concluded that the lower court was absolutely
correct in its ruling. Since Mr. Miller [a
co-defendant] was purportedly ready to
testify as to the intention of robbing the
victim there is no question but that a jury
could have believed Miller's testimony and
[could] have found Defendant guilty of
capital murder. The argument that Defendant
made to the lower court was simply without
merit.
Initially, counsel considered filing an
Anders brief allowing Defendant to argue his
position in spite of counsel's belief to the
contrary. A-ppellate counsel has spoken [at]
length with Defendant at the Utah State
Prison and is now able to represent that
Defendant concurs in this assessment and
therefore withdraws any appeal based upon the
grounds previously raised below.
Counsel further states that under State v. Clavton, 639
P.2d 168 (Utah 1981), and State v. Gabaldon, 735 P.2d 410 (Utah
Ct. App. 1987) , an attorney representing a criminal defendant on
appeal may withdraw only if he finds the case to be wholly
frivolous but that "the present situation is somewhat of a
hybrid. The grounds raised by the defendant are clearly
frivolous and cannot be supported. On the other hand, grounds
that were not raised by the defendant below are, in the opinion
of counsel, meritorious and deserve consideration by some
reviewing court." We agree that other evidence of Smith's intent
to rob existed and that the trial court properly denied the
motion to withdraw the guilty plea.
The issue that appellate counsel urges us to address
for the first time on appeal is whether the trial court erred in
entering a twenty-year recommendation of incarceration with
respect to Smith's prison sentence. Counsel asserts that there
was no factual record before the trial court justifying that
recommendation. We refuse to address the issue.
It is black-letter law that an appellate court will not
address issues raised for the first time on appeal except in
extraordinary circumstances that do not exist here. Onq Int'l,
Inc. v. llth Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 455 (Utah 1993); State v.
Allen, 839 P.2d 291, 302 (Utah 1992); State v. Steqqell, 660 P.2d
252, 254 (Utah 1983). However, the district court may address

No. 920141

2

/hTT/fCtf/n&JT

JJZ"

Tliis opinion is subject to revision before final
publication in the Pacific Reporter.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
00O00

State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

No. 920141
F I L E D
December 27, 1993

Tracy Eugene Smith,
Defendant and Appellant.

Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk

Fifth District, Beaver County
The Honorable Philip J. Eves
Attorneys:

R. Paul Van Dam, Att'y Gen., Joanne C. Slotnik, Asst,
Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff
Craig s. Cook, Salt Lake City, for defendant

STEWART, Justice:
Tracy Eugene Smith
murder. He was charged with
another while engaged in the
commit robbery or aggravated
§ 76-5-202(1)(d). The trial
imprisonment and recommended
parole or even be considered
least Twenty (2 0) years."

pleaded guilty to first degree
intentionally causing the death of
commission of or an attempt to
robbery. See Utah Cede Ann.
court sentenced him to life
that "the Defendant not be allowed
for parole until he has served at

On December 4, 1991, Smith moved to withdraw his guilty
plea on the ground that the trial court could not have reasonably
accepted a guilty plea for capital murder because Smith had
denied that he was attempting to rob the victim at the time of
the^murder. On February 24, 1992, the trial court denied the
motion to withdraw the guilty plea. Smith filed a notice of
appeal'from that ruling on March 20, 1992. Subsequently, on
December 4, 1992, Smith filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus in this Court, alleging that he had received ineffective
assistance of counsel during the sentencing proceeding. On
January 5, 1993, this Court referred the habeas petition to the
Third District Court, where it is currently pending.

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
BEAVER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

vs.

CASE NO. 631
JUDGE J. PHILIP EVES

TRACY EUGENE SMITH,
Defendant.

The above-captioned matter came before this Court on Defendant's Motion of
Reconsideration of Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea and Correct Illegal Sentence.
The Defendant moves this Court to reconsider the decision executed August 21, 1997,
wherein the Court denied Plaintiffs Motion and Order for Appointment of Legal Counsel.
This Court has reviewed Defendant's motion, as well as the Court's previous decisions on
similar motions. Having reviewed the file, having reviewed the applicable law, and deeming
itself fully advised in the premises, the Court now makes the following findings and
conclusions:
1. On November 14 1988, the Defendant was convicted of murder pursuant to the
entry of a guilty plea. What followed thereafter were numerous attempts, both to this Court
and to the state appellate courts, on the part of the Defendant to have this guilty plea
withdrawn and have the matter set for trial. In all such instances, this Court denied
Defendant's motions, which denials were affirmed by the appellate courts.
2. Following Defendant's July 28, 1997 Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea and
Correct liiegal Sentence, wherein Defendant requested the Court to appoint legal counsel and
requested that his guilty plea be withdrawn and his sentence be "corrected," this Court issued
a decision denying Defendant's motion. At that time, this Court held that, though it was
within its discretion to appoint counsel on a pro bono basis, that Defendant's petition neither
contained factual allegations necessitating an evidentiary hearing, nor did it involve
complicated issues of law or fact requiring the assistance of counsel. Therefore, this Court
declined to appoint legal counsel on Defendant's behalf, pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-36-109
(1996). (Mem. of P. & A., pp. 2-3) This Court further found that Defendant's motion was
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not timely, in that the applicable statute of limitations period had expired for bringing forward
such motions. (Id. at p. 3)
3. Defendant claimed he was not advised that the recommendations made by the
prosecutor and defense counsel were not binding on the Court, and that such knowledge
would have altered the outcome. This Court declined to grant Defendant's motion on this
claim on grounds that the Defendant failed to present new evidence, and that the statute of
limitations period had expired for that relief as well. (Id. at pp. 3-4)
4. Defendant's present motion requests a reconsideration of that prior order.
The Defendant primarily focuses on two different claims. First, the Defendant claims that he
was inadequately represented by counsel at the time the plea agreement was entered on the
record, in that the State would be unable to establish that Defendant had the requisite intent to
commit the crime in a trial on the matter, which defense counsel failed to properly consider.
Second, the Defendant claims that this Court committed error in failing to advise the
Defendant that any sentencing recommendations agreed upon by the prosecution and defense
counsel were not binding on the Court.
5. As a preliminary matter, this Court finds that the rules of civil procedure do not
include a provision for motions for reconsideration. See Ron Shepherd Ins.. Inc. v. Shields.
882 P.2d 650 (Utah 1994). However, it has been the practice of some courts to address
motions which have been so titled as if they had been filed pursuant to an applicable rule. See
Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa & Son. 808 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1991). This Court finds that
Defendant's motion finds some applicability with Rule 60 of the rules of civil procedure,
which provides for relief from a judgment or order. A motion for relief from a judgment or
order may be granted by a court to provide relief from a final judgment, order, or proceeding
under certain circumstances, including but not limited to the discovery of new evidence, or
any other reason justifying relief. U.R.C.P. 60(b) (1997).
6. With respect to Defendant's claim that this Court failed to properly advise
according to U.R.Cr.P. 11(g)(2), this Court finds that this rule provides the following:
If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court shall advise the
defendant personally that any recommendation as to sentence is not binding on the
court.
This Court agrees that, in accordance with the decision State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309
(Utah 1987), courts are required to strictly comply with the provisions of Rule 11, and that
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the purpose behind this rule is to ensure defendants are guaranteed their constitutional rights.
7. However, this Court would also point out that the provision at issue affords
protection only if sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court. In the case at hand,
the Defendant was charged with a capital offense, the criminal penalties for which are
statutorily designated as either the death penalty or life imprisonment. U.C.A. § 76-3-207(4),
(6) (1996). In addition, the parties had entered into a conditional plea agreement which
expressly provided that Defendant would be sentenced to life imprisonment rather than face
the potentiality of a death sentence in a trial by jury. Therefore, according to the statute, and
the plea arrangement agreed to by the parties, the term of Defendant's sentence was not an
issue at the time of sentencing.
8. At the time the Defendant entered his plea, this Court asked counsel if they had
any recommendations regarding sentencing. This question, taken out of context, may be what
has confused the Defendant and led him to believe that some violation of his Rule 11 rights
was violated. However, when taken in context, the question was asked and responded to in
light of Defendant's right to delay the imposition of sentencing for a period of thirty days.
Counsel for the Defendant responded by saying that the Defendant desired to waive that time,
and that a presentence report was unnecessary in light of the nature of the plea. Therefore,
this Court does not find merit in Defendant's claim that the Court erred by violating
Defendant's Rule 11 protections.
9. With respect to Defendant's claim that he received ineffective assistance of
counsel at the time he entered his plea, this Court agrees with Defendant's interpretation of
U.C.A. § 78-35a-106(2), insofar as the statute permits individuals challenging a conviction or
sentence to seek relief on grounds they received ineffective assistance of counsel, and that this
claim is exempt from the statute of limitations period governing appeals. However,! this
Court would add that, in order to establish that he was poorly represented, the Defendant
must satisfy a two-prong test:
First, a petitioner must show "that his counsel rendered a deficient performance in
some demonstrable manner, which performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonable professional judgment." . . .Second, a petition must show that his
counsel's performance prejudiced him.
Tavlor v. Warden. 905 P.2d 277, 282 (Utah 1995); quoting Bundv v. Deland. 763 P.2d 803,
805 (Utah 1988).

conclusions which had in fact been executed. The Court stated,
"The Findings entered may remain with these adjustments."
On December 27, 1993 the Supreme Court in Case No. 92-0141
affirmed the lower court's denial of Mr. Smith's Motion to
Withdraw his guilty plea and discussed the issue that was raised
for the first time on appeal concerning Appellant's claim that
the lower court had insufficient evidence in order to make a
twenty year recommendation of a sentence. Because this issue was
raised for the first time on appeal, the Supreme Court refused to
hear it. The Court stated, "However, the District Court may
address the issue of the twenty-year recommendation in Smith's
pending Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus."
These procedural events, as seems to be typical of this
case, cannot be readily classified under our rules of civil
procedure. I view them as follows: The state submitted proposed
Findings to the Court which had not been approved as to form by
myself. Through a misunderstanding I assumed that my objections
had been filed concurrently but apparently they were not. This
Court, based upon no objections, entered the Findings on November
22.
No official notice was sent to me that the Judgment had been
entered in accordance with Rule 58A(d). Nevertheless, I sent to
this Court my proposed changes and additions to the Findings
submitted by the State. This letter and proposed Findings was
essentially a motion under Rule 52 or Rule 59 requesting an
amendment of the Findings and Judgment.
The Minute Entry of December 14, in my view, was therefore a
decision denying the requested changes except for two specific
Findings. The Minute Entry, however, is not a final order for
any purpose and thus an order needs to be prepared officially
amending the previously-entered Findings.
Since a final judgment has not been entered in this case
Rule 59 would allow Petitioner to file a Motion to Open the
Judgment to take additional evidence, if necessary, as to the
issue that has been referred to this Court by the Utah Supreme
Court.
After this Court enters a decision as to the "judge's
recommendation issue", then the entire matter could be finalized
if an order which then could be appealable to the Supreme Court
in Petitioner desires.
While I acknowledge that this above scenario is open to
debate, I believe that this is the precise reason that a
conference should be held in order to discuss the most prudent
way of proceeding to avoid any further road blocks to completing
this case. I would be most happy to schedule a conference with
the Court and with Ms. Micklos at any time during the next four
weeks.

10. The burden of satisfying the first prong weighs heavily against the Defendant.
"To prevail on the first prong, a petitioner must overcome a strong presumption that counsel
rendered adequate assistance." 14. (citations omitted). This requires the Defendant to
demonstrate specific instances where counsel acted or failed to act in a manner which does
not meet an objective standard of reasonableness. Id- (citations omitted). Importantly, courts
reviewing an attorney's performance will grant "counsel wide latitude to make tactical
decisions and will not question such decisions unless . . . [there is] !no reasonable basis' for
them." &., quoting Fernandez v. Cook. 870 P.2d 870, 876 (Utah 1993).
11. In the present case, defense counsel addressed the Court with regard to the
weaknesses in the State's case against the Defendant. At that time, defense counsel stated
that, in light of the fact that Defendant's co-defendant was involved in a criminal case arising
out of the same incident, and that testimony might be elicited in that case which would
implicate the Defendant in a robbery offense, it was advisable for the Defendant to accept the
terms of the plea. When taking the co-defendant's criminal case into consideration, and the
possibility that Defendant faced a death sentence if his case had resulted in a jury trial, it is
the opinion of this Court that defense counsel's advice that Defendant sign the plea agreement
had a reasonable basis which does not reflect ineffective assistance of counsel.
12. As this Court has determined Defendant failed to satisfy the first prong required
to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, it will not reach the issue of whether Defendant
satisfied the second prong. Therefore, this Court finds that the Defendant has failed to set
forth any new facts or present any other reason which would warrant providing relief from
this Court's August 21, 1997 decision.
13. In conclusion, this Court would direct Defendant's attention to the Court's
finding in the August 21, 1997 Memorandum of Points and Authorities, wherein the Court
determined that Defendant's motion was frivolous, repetitive and without merit pursuant to
U.R.C.P. 65(B)(5). This Court would also direct Defendant's attention to the case Wright v.
Carver. 886 P.2d 58, 60 (Utah 1994), which held:
"A ground for relief from a conviction or sentence that has once been fully and
fairly adjudicated on appeal or in a prior habeas proceeding should not be
readjudicated unless it can be shown that there are 'unusual circumstances.' . . .This
rule was fashioned to prevent abuse by prisoners who burden the courts and
frustrate the ends of justice by trying to keep cases alive indefinitely,'"

January 13, 1994
Honorable David S. Young
Third District Court
240 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Re:

Tracy Eugene Smith v. Hank Galetka, et al.
Case No. 93-0900217HC

Dear Judge Young:
I have recently completed an extensive review of this case
together with the decision rendered last month by the Utah
Supreme Court. Unfortunately, because of various procedural
difficulties which have occurred in this case, I am at a loss as
to how to proceed. For this reason, I would request a conference
with counsel in order to have the opportunity to determine how to
proceed in the future.
In order to allow the Court and counsel an insight into my
concerns I offer the following. At the conclusion of the hearing
in this case you ordered that Ms. Micklos prepare Findings in
support of your judgment. I was to be sent the Findings for my
approval as to form. Accordingly, Ms. Micklos sent me her
proposed Findings and in order to try to expedite this case T
sent to her my proposed changes to her Findings and Conclusions
on November 3, 1993. On November 9 she sent me a letter stating
she could not accept these changes and that the Findings would
therefore be submitted to.
I assumed that my objections were also included with her
Findings but I do not know if they were or not. In any event, on
November 22 the Court executed the Findings and Judgment. On
November 29 I sent this Court a letter stating that I was not
sure if my objections had been received and therefore enclosed a
copy of my objections for consideration. At that time I did not
know that the Court had already executed the Findings and Order.
On December 14 this Court issued a Minute Entry declining to
sing the requested Findings offered by me but finding that the
Court disagreed with portions of two of the findings and

Id., quoting Hurst v. Cook. 777 P.2d 1029, 1036 (Utah 1989). This Court finds that the
present motion merely recited those arguments made by Defendant on other occasions, and
represents an attempt to keep his case alive indefinitely. As such, it was within this Court's
discretion to dismiss the present motion without including findings of fact or conclusions of
law.
14. Based on the foregoing, Defendant's Motion of Reconsideration of Defendant's
Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea and Correct Illegal Sentence is DENIED.

Dated at Parowan, Utah this 2bi_T day of September, 1997.
BY THE COURT:
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to weigh probabilities and "what ifs" then an evidentiary hearing
should be held so that factual findings can be made concerning
these predictions and probability assessments.
assert, however

Petitioner would

that the record on its face clearly shows that

he was denied effective representation of counsel by the complete
failure to meet the standards of an attorney representing a
defendant in a capital murder case in which a substantial
sentence is extremely possible.
For these reasons, therefore, this matter should be set for
hearing either on the merits or remanded for an evidentiary
hearing to answer any of the questions that are pertinent to this
petition.
DATED this 28th day of December, 1992.

Craig S. C6fok
Attorney for Petitioner
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing to J. Frederic Voros, Jr., Assistant Attorney
General, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
this 28th day of December, 1992.
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JN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR BEAVER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
i

STATE OF UTAH,

j

MEMORANDUM OF
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

Plaintiff,
CASE NO. 631

vs.
TRACY EUGENE SMITH,
Defendant.

This matter came before the Court this date on the petitioner's Motion and Order for
Appointment of Legal Counsel. The petitioner moves the Court for appointment of legal
counsel to be paid by Beaver County and to pursue petitioner's most recent motion to
withdraw his plea.
The defendant was convicted of murder upon his plea of guilty on November 14, 1988.
Thereafter in December 1991, the defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea after
having lost his direct appeal rights by inaction. The Court denied the request to withdraw the
guilty plea and the matter was pursued by appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah.
On December 27, 1993, the Supreme Court issued its opinion addressing the claims raised by
the defendant, including the letter written by this Court to the Board of Pardons recommending
that the defendant serve at least 20 years. The trial court's denial of the Motion to Withdraw
the plea was upheld. Thereafter the defendant herein filed a motion for an order of the Court
correcting the sentence which Mr. Smith claimed was illegal. The Court issued a
Memorandum Opinion on July 19, 1996, in which the defendant's motion was denied. That

which occurred or could have occurred because of counsel's
conduct during the sentencing proceedings-

See Petitioner's

Memorandum at 10-16.
The State wishes Petitioner to be a fortune teller.

The

State wishes Petitioner to allege what the judge woud have done
had Petitioner's attorney presented the information to him as he
should have done under an effective counsel standard.

Petitioner

submits that there is a reasonable probability that the conduct
of his counsel undermined the confidence in the outcome of the
sentencing recommendation.

Again, Petitioner was entitled to

present reliable information to the court as part of his
constitutional sentencing rights.

Whether the judge would have

done anything differently after this material had been presented
is not the question.

It is the failure to present this material

which is the crux of this petition.

In the context of a trial

setting, it cannot be said that the complete failure of Mr.
Shumate to present any evidence or arguments in the sentencing
hearing was "harmless error."
The State also wishes Petitioner to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the twenty-year recommendation made by the
court conclusively caused the twenty-year sentence imposed by the
Board of Pardons.

This kind of proof is not required here.

The

mere coincidence of the twenty-year term in both proceedings
establishes a "reasonable probability" that the judge's
recommendation was followed by the Board of Pardons.
The State, in summary, is attempting to use technicalities
to escape a clear case of possible injustice.

-9-

If it is necessary
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determination was appealed. On April 3, 1997, the Court of Appeals issued a Memorandum
Opinion upholding the decision of the trial court.
In addition Mr. Smith filed in the 3rd-District Court the case of Smith v. Galetka. Case
No. 930900217, which was a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. In that case Mr. Smith
raised additional claims as to the propriety of the taking of his plea. The trial court ruled
against Mr. Smith in that case, and Mr. Smith did not appeal.

MOTION TO APPOINT T.EOAL COUNSEL
On July 28, 1997, Mr. Smith filed yet another Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea and
Correct Illegal Sentence. He now seeks to have this Court appoint counsel to represent him
and proposes to require the County of Beaver to pay the costs of that Motion and the
subsequent proceedings.
Under the provisions of 78-35a-101 UCA, et. Seq.. the Court has authority only to
appoint pro bono counsel. There is no provision for appointments paid by the county where
the conviction occurred.
This Court apparently has discretion as to whether or not to appoint counsel. (See 7835a-109 UCA) Although this is a serious case for the petitioner in view of the long period of
confinement which he is undergoing, the Court is of the opinion that Mr. Smith has had
several opportunities to raise the issues which he thought were appropriate relating to his entry
of his plea of guilty in this case. The Court can see no reason to appoint counsel in this case
and hereby declines to do so.

The Lockhart case acknowledged that in many instances an
inquiry of "prejudice11 will depend on likelihoods of various
circumstances and how they would have most probably affected the
outcome of a trial or plea.

Petitioner was entitled to be

informed of all available pertinent information concerning
sentencing.

By not being given this information he was clearly

prejudiced as a matter of law by being unable to make a knowing
and voluntary decision.

If he stated today that he would not

have entered the plea had he known this twenty-year
recommendation would be made, such a statement would be
meaningless since the inquiry in these type of cases is at the
time the guilty plea was made.

The failure to correctly advise a

defendant as to pertinent sentencing information creates
automatic prejudice regardless of what outcome a defendant may
have chosen had he been correctly advised.
The second portion of the argument made by the State is
equally absurd.

The State claims that the petition never alleges

that but for counsel's errors the judge would have made a
different recommendation or no recommendation at all.
(Respondents' Brief at 8 ) . This statement is simply not true.
As noted in the Memorandum of Points and Authorities which was
incorporated by reference in the habeas corpus petition, "had
Petitioner's appointed counsel been effective the twenty-year
recommendation made by the lower court at the conclusion of the
sentencing proceeding may well not have been made." (Petitioner's
Memorandum of Points and Authorities at 2 ) . Moreover, Petitioner
devoted seven pages of his Memorandum to showing the prejudice

-8-
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Section 78-35a-109 UCA requires the court to consider two factors in deciding whether
to appoint pro bono counsel. The court has considered those factors. This case raises only
one issue, ie: whether the defendant can withdraw his plea of guilty. Defendant alleges that
this court failed to comply with the provisions of Rule 11, U.R.Crim.P. There is no need for
an evidentiary hearing as the issues can be decided from the transcripts and records of the
taking of the plea. In addition, in view of the provisions of 78-35a-106 UCA and 78-35a-107
UCA, this court will be dismissing and denying the Motion because the Statute of Limitations
period has passed and the claim raised by the defendant in this motion was raised and
addressed in previous appeal proceedings, or should have been, or was raised and addressed in
previous post conviction relief proceedings, or should have been.
The issues do not appear complicated and there is no need for an evidentiary hearing.
Thus the appointment of pro bono counsel is not warranted.
The petitioner's Motion for Appointment of Legal Counsel is denied.

MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA AND CORRECT ILLEGAL SENTENCE
On August 4, 1997, Mr. Smith filed a Notice to Submit for Decision and Request for
Hearing on his most recent motion to withdraw the guilty plea. The Court declines to set the
matter for oral argument. The Court has read the Motion submitted by Mr. Smith and the
affidavits included herewith. Mr. Smith challenges the entry of the plea in this case on the
grounds that he was not advised that the recommendations of the prosecution and his own
attorney were not binding upon the Court.

properly advise him as to his eligibility for parole under the
sentence agreed to in the plea bargain.

The Supreme Court held

that neither Arkansas nor Federal law required that petitioner be
informed of his parole eligibility date prior to pleading guilty.
The Court stated:
We have never held that the United States
Constitution requires the State to furnish a defendant
with information about parole eligibility in order for
the defendant's plea of guilty to be voluntary, and
indeed such a constitutional requirement would be
inconsistent with the current rules of procedure
governing the entry of guilty pleas in the Federal
court. 47 4 U.S. at 56.
In the instant case, the information which was omitted by
Petitioner's counsel was not that of parole but was that of
sentencing.

Numerous cases hold that matters affecting the

sentence of a defendant allow withdrawal of a guilty plea if all
elements and facts and circumstances are not fully explained.
See State v. Smith, 776 P.2d 929 (Utah 1989); State v. Copeland,
765 P.2d 1266 (Utah 1988); State v. West, 765 P.2d 891 (Utah
1988); State v. Vasilacopulous, 756 P.2d 92 (Utah App.
1988) .
Once again, the State has distorted the record by failing to
complete the quotation cited in Respondents' memorandum.

The

State makes the following assertion:
•

.

'

•

.

•

-

*

-

•

In his affidavit he states under oath, "Had I
known that the judge was going to make this kind of
recommendation I don't know whether I would have
entered this plea or not... (Respondents' Memorandum
at 7) .
The State omitted the following subsequent language of that
sentence, "since the state had very weak evidence concerning the
attempt to rob Mr. Bray."

(Affidavit at 18).
-7-
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Defendant has had repeated opportunities to raise this issue, including a prior motion to
withdraw his plea. There is no new evidence alleged by defendant. The limitations period for
post-conviction relief has passed. (See 78-35a-107 UCA)
Pursuant to Rule 65B(5), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, this court now finds that this
motion is frivolous, repetitive and without merit. In addition, it is unsupported by the records
of the plea.
Accordingly for the reasons set out above, the Motion is denied.
DATED this 21st day of August 1997.

itself.
In failing to file a direct appeal, Petitioner cannot be
held accountable for listening to the advice of the
court-appointed attorney who is now being accused of being
ineffective.

Fernandez v. Cook, 783 P.2d 547 (Utah 1989).

In

addition, this Court has held that the writ of habeas corpus is a
flexible protection to protect against the denial of a
constitutional right in a criminal conviction and that the "good
cause" requirement is justified for a number of reasons including
the existence of fundamental unfairness in a conviction.

Hearst

v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029 (Utah 1989).
Accordingly, this petition is not procedurally barred and
must not be dismissed.
POINT II
THIS PETITION SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED
UNDER HILL V. LOCKHART.
The State next argues that under Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S.
52 (1985) Petitioner has failed to allege sufficient prejudice to
allow this matter to proceed.

This claim is broken by the State

into two parts: first, the assertion by Petitioner that his
counsel failed to inform him as to the twenty-year sentence
recommendation or that the judge could make such a
recommendation; and second, the other matters concerning
counsel's representation during the guilty plea proceeding.
These parts will now be addressed sequentially.
The Hill v. Lockhart case, contrary to the State's
assertion, is not identical "in all material respects to the case
at bar." In Hill the petitioner claimed his attorney failed to
-6-
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followed by the Board of Pardons.
Garrish involved (1) a direct appeal, (2) a full evidentiary
hearing as to a subsequent motion to withdraw the guilty plea,
(3) an appeal from that denial; (4) three separate habeas corpus
actions; and (5) an appeal from the denial of the third habeas
corpus petition.

In contrast to this abundance of judicial

procedure in Garrish, the petitioner in this case did not file
any direct appeal from his entry of guilty plea based upon the
advice of his court-appointed attorney, James Shumate.

Appearing

pro se, Petitioner filed a motion to withdraw the guilty plea but
no evidentiary hearing was held.

The Court ordered the dismissal

of the motion based solely upon the record.

It was not until the

proceedings before this Court with Petitioner's new
court-appointed attorney that the present claims in the direct
appeal and habeas corpus action have been made.

This blemished

legal process supports the contention of Justice Zimmerman in
Garrish that counsel should be provided in a thorough post
conviction proceeding and appeal.
Clearly, Petitioner was not previously aware of the
ineffectiveness of counsel in sentencing now being asserted in
the habeas corpus action filed in this court.

The State's

repeated reference that he was aware of such a claim four years
earlier is a complete distortion of the record.

(Respondents'

Brief at 4 ) . His earlier statement in his affidavit concerning
his counsel's failure to investigate the facts of the crime
certainly does not preclude an ineffectiveness claim being made
as to his counsel's performance during the guilty plea proceeding

-5-

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR BEAVER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MEMORANDUM OPINION

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 631

vs.
TRACY EUGENE SMITH,
Defendant.

The defendant, Tracy Eugene Smith, entered a plea of guilty to the crime of Murder
in the First Degree, a capital felony, on November 14, 1988. The Court sentenced him to
serve a life sentence and recommended to the Board of Pardons that he serve at least 20
years before being allowed parole. The defendant has since filed at least one appeal and
several petitions for extraordinary relief.
On May 15, 1996, the defendant caused to be filed a "Motion for an Order of Court
Correcting a Sentence that was Imposed in an Illegal Manner." The defendant moves the
Court to correct or modify the sentence given by deleting the Court's recommendation' that
the defendant serve 20 years before being paroled. The defendant correctly argues that the
Court can correct an illegal sentence at any time. (See Rule 22, Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure.)
The alleged illegality raised by the defendant is that the Court sentenced the defendant
to a life sentence and then made a recommendation pursuant to 77-27-13(5) UCA. The
defendant argues that the Court acted illegally because that statutory provision, by its own
terms, applies only to cases where an "indeterminate sentence is imposed." Defendant takes

Counsel has read the Garrish case several times and has been
unable to find anywhere in the opinion that a motion to withdraw
a guilty plea is considered a prior post-conviction proceeding in
relation to habeas corpus petitions.

Rule 20, for example, of

the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure only requests a "statement
indicating whether any other petition for a writ of habeas corpus
based upon the same or similar grounds has been filed and the
reason why relief was denied.

(Rule 20(c)(3)).

The issues in a motion to withdraw a guilty plea and a
habeas corpus action can be quite distinct.

In the motion to

withdraw action, the question is whether the defendant made a
knowing plea or whether the State and the Court breached its
agreement with the defendant.

In many cases involving guilty

plea motions no claim whatsoever is made of ineffectiveness of
counsel.

Likewise, a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel in a

habeas corpus action may have nothing whatsoever to do with the
entry of the guilty plea.

It is for this reason that two

post-conviction remedies cannot be used as procedural bars in the
sense of two successive petitions for habeas corpus.
The distinction in Garrish and the instant case is
remarkable.

Garrish was convicted of child abuse and was

ultimately sentenced to a minilmum mandatory term of six years to
life.

During the proceedings he was represented by three

separate attorneys.

Here, Petitioner, who was 21 years old at

the time of the conviction, was represented by only one attorney
and was sentenced to life imprisonment with a twenty-year
recommendation of imprisonment.

This recommendation is now being

-4-

-2the position, citing no authority ^porting his view, that a life sentence is not an
indeterminate sentence.
The Court now holds that the position of the defendant is incorrect under the Utah
sentencing scheme. In fact a life sentence for Murder, a capital felony, is an indeterminate
sentence. Therefore the sentence is not illegal.
Under Utah's sentencing scheme, all commitments to prison are considered
indeterminate sentences unless otherwise provided by law. (77-18-4 UCA) Utah's
Constitution and statutes provide for a Board of Pardons which body is charged with the
authority and responsibility oi delinking whether a sentence will be fully served, modified,
or terminated. (See 77-27-5 UCA; Andrus v. Turner. 590 P.2d 363; Raslins v. Holden. 869
P-2d 958.)
The Board of Pardons has unfettered discretion in carrying out its function and its
decisions are not subject to judicial scrutiny, except in limited cases.
An indeterminate sentence is one fixed by the sentencing authority (the Court) as a
maximum sentence or within a possible minimum/maximum range, understanding that the
actual time to be serve will be later determined by another entity, the Board of Pardons.1
The alternative plan, determinate sentencing, is used in some states and jurisdictions. Under
determinate sentencing the Court fixes the exact number of years, months or days to be
served by the defendant and no other entity has authority to require more or less, as long as
the sentence is legally permissible. This is not Utah's approach to sentencing.

*See Mutart v. Pratt. 170 P.67; State v. Empev. 239 P.25; Lee Lim v. Davis. 284
P.232.

Minute Entry substantiates Petitioner's claim by the following
statement:
This matter was called on for hearing at the
request of the defendant, Mr, Shumate informed and
the defendant concurred that the motion be voluntarily
withdrawn. Mr. Shumate stated that the defendant will
pursue his requested relief in the Federal court
system. The appeal was ordered withdrawn.
(R. 86).
The motion to withdraw the guilty plea was filed on December
4, 1991 by the petitioner pro se.

His sole grounds for the

petition was that there was insufficient evidence to charge him
with first degree murder.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THIS PETITION IS NOT PROCEDURALLY BARRED
SINCE PETITIONER COULD NOT HAVE BROUGHT
HIS INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE CLAIM IN HIS
PRIOR MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA.
The State argues that since Petitioner did not raise the
ineffectiveness of counsel in his motion to withdraw the guilty
plea he is now barred from raising it in this habeas corpus
action.

The State cites the case of Garrish v. Barnes as

standing for the proposition "a motion to withdraw a guilty plea
is a prior post-conviction proceeding for procedural bar
purposes." Again, the State completely distorts the status of
Utah law.

In Garrish this Court held that Garrish was

procedurally barred by failing to raise the issue of the breached
plea bargain on appeal from the denial of the motion to withdraw
the guilty plea.

This Court did not hold that the motion to

withdraw the guilty plea precluded a subsequent habeas corpus
action.

-3-

-3A life sentence for capital murder is an indeterminate sentence modifiable by the
Board of Pardons. Otherwise the Court's recommendation of 20 years before parole would
be irrelevant and meaningless and this Motion would never have been made. It is evident
that the Utah Legislature considers a life sentence for capital murder as an indeterminate
sentence, since it has enacted, since the sentencing in this case, a new possible sentence in
such cases, life without possibility of parole. (See 76-3-201 UCA)
The defendant's Motion is denied. The sentence in his case was not illegal as he
complains.
DATED this

?

~day of July 1996.

important facts.

For example, the State makes the following

quotation:
Petitioner therein stated that he had been
assured by his attorney "that a timely notice of
appeal would be filed with this Court, base[d] upon
but not limited to effective assistance of counsel."
(R. 69). (Respondent's Memorandum, at 2 ) .
Respondents conveniently left out the last sentence that
Petitioner wrote following that quoted by the respondents.

It

stated, "That counsel did not fully investigate the facts of the
case at bar that could have proven the defendant's innocence."
(R.

69). Thus, contrary to the State's repeated assertions, any

mention of ineffective counsel in this prior motion had nothing
whatsoever to do with the proceedings of the guilty plea but
instead concerned a claim that counsel failed to investigate the
facts of the killing.
A second serious omission concerns the facts and
circumstances relating to the "notice of belated appeal." On
January 27, 1989 the Clerk of this Court sent a notice to the
Beaver County Clerk that a notice of appeal had been filed in
Case No.

890027 (R.

74). On March 20, 1989 a hearing was held

before the Honorable J. Philip Eves.

Defendant was once again

represented by his court-appointed attorney, James L. Shumate.
If the question of this appeal becomes relevant, Petitioner would
proffer that in his conversations with Mr. Shumate he was
informed that he could not raise any claim of ineffectiveness of
counsel on appeal and that therefore he should go into the
Federal court and file a habeas corpus action if he was unhappy
with Mr. Shumate's performance concerning the investigation.

-2-
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CRAIG S. COOKr No. 713
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
3645 East 3100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
Telephone: 48 5-8123

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

TRACY EUGENE SMITH,
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION
TO RESPONDENTS1 MOTION
TO DISMISS HABEAS PETITIC

Petitioner,
vs.
HANK GALETKA, North Point Warden,
UTAH STATE PRISON and THE
STATE OF UTAH,

No. 920553

Respondents.

This Memorandum is written in opposition to Respondents'
Motion to Dismiss the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed on
December 18, 1992.
The State has distorted the factual record in this case as
well as applicable case law, and has failed to correctly analyze
the facts and legal principles as they apply to this case.

For

these ireasons, therefore, Petitioner is compelled to respond to
its Memorandum.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The State attempts to argue that Petitioner in December of
1988 had the opportunity of filing a direct appeal in this matter
and did not do so.

The State has left out, however, several

-1-

(FOIL

ipl

w

[Jfi\/ i ." 1 0 0 0

LEO G. KANELL
Beaver County Attorney
Attorney for Plaintiff
P. O. Box 471
Beaverr Utah 84713
Telephone: 438-2351

•A

Clert
Depute

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BEAVER, STATE OF UTAH

STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT
REGARDING PLEA BARGAIN,
CERTIFICATES OF COUNSEL,
AND ORDER

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff
vs.

Criminal No, 631

TRACY EUGENE SMITH,
Defendant.

STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT REGARDING PLEA AGREEMENT
I, TRACY EUGENE SMITH, the above-named Defendant, under
oath, hereby acknowledge that I have entered a plea of guilty to
the charge of MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE, a capital offense, as
contained

in

the

Information

on

file

against

me

in

the

above-entitled Court, a copy of which I have received, and I
understand the charge to which this plea of guilty is entered is
a capital felony and that I am entering such plea voluntarily and
of my own free will after conferring with my attorney, JAMES L.
SHUMATE,

and

with

following facts:

the

knowledge

and

understanding

of

the

4rmcj4"?£'J7

J£ •

1.

I know that I have constitutional rights under the

Constitutions of Utah and the United States to plead not guilty
and to have a jury trial upon the charges to which I have entered
a plea of guilty or to a trial by the Court should I elect to
waive

a

trial by jury.

I know

that

I have a right to be

represented by counsel and that I am in fact represented by JAMES
L. SHUMATE as my attorney,
2.

I know that if I wish to have a trial upon the

charges, I have a right to be confronted by the witnesses against
me by having them testify, in open court, in my presence and
before the Court and jury and that I have the right to have those
witnesses cross-examined by my attorney.
the right to have witnesses

subpoenaed

I also know that I have
by the State, at its

expense, to testify in Court upon my behalf and that I could, if
I elected to do so, testify in Court upon my own behalf and that,
if I choose not to do so, the jury can and will be told that this
fact may not be held against me if I choose to have the jury so
instructed.
3.

I know that if I were to have a trial, the State

must prove each and every element of the crime charged to the
satisfaction of the Court or jury beyond a reasonable doubt; that
I would have no obligation to offer any evidence myself and that
any verdict rendered by a jury, whether it be that of guilty or
not guilty, must be by unanimous agreement of all jurors.
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C E R T I F I C A T E
STATE OF UTAH

)
} 33.

COUNTY OF WASHINGTON )
41

I. PAUL G. MCMULLIN, CSR, RPR, a Notary

51

Public, in and for the County of Washington, State of

6|

Utah, do hereby certify:

7|

That, the foregoing matter, to wit,
STATE OF UTAH VS. TRACY EUGENE SMITH, CRIMINAL NO. 621,

0|

was taken down by ma in shorthand at the time and place

10

therein named and thereafter reduced to computerized

11

transcription under my direction.

12

I further testify that I am not interested

12
14

in the event cf the action.
WITNESS my hand and seal this 22rd day of

15 J

December, 1988

16
17
18
191

PAUL G. MCMULLIN, CSR, RPR

!C
21J

RESIDING AT: St. George, Utah
<

^.

MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: 6-17-91

PAUL G. MCMULLIN, CSR, RPR
P. C. 3o:c 1524 - St. Gecrge, Ut. (SOI) 673-5215

4.

I know that under the Constitutions of Utah and of

the United States I have a right against self-incrimination or a
right- not to give evidence against myself and that this means
that I cannot be compelled to testify in Court upon trial unless
I choose to do so.
r4 O

5.

I know that under the Constitution of Utah, if I

were tried and convicted by a jury or by the Court, I would have
a right to appeal my conviction and sentence to either the Court
of Appeals or the Supreme Court of Utah for review of the trial
proceedings and that if I could not afford to pay the costs for
such appeal, those costs would be paid by the State without cost
to me and that I would have the right to have the assistance of
counsel on such appeal.
/R^

6.

I know and understand that by entering a plea of

guilty I am waiving my constitutional rights as set out in the
five

preceding

paragraphs

and

that

I

am,

in

fact,

fully

incriminating myself by admitting that I am guilty of the crimes
to which my plea of guilty is entered.
.H^

7.

I know that under the laws of Utah the maximum

sentence that can and may be imposed upon my plea of guilty to
the charges identified on page one of this affidavit is:
A.

Death or life imprisonment,

and that the imprisonment may be for consecutive periods if my
plea is to more than one charge.

I also know that if I am on

probation, parole or awaiting sentencing upon another offense of
-3-

MR. SMITH:

Yas. sir.

THE COURT:

All right.

Good luck.

(Whereupon the proceedings in the
ibcve-entitled matter were concluded.)

6
7
S
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
1 T

IS
10
20
21

PAUL G. MCMULLIN. CSR, RPR

which I have been convicted or to which I have pleaded guilty, my
plea in the present action may result in consecutive sentences
being imposed on me.
rtS

8.

I know that the fact that I have entered a plea of

guilty does not mean that the Court will not impose either a fine
or sentence of imprisonment upon me and no promises have been
made to me by anyone as to what the sentence will be if I plead
guilty or that it will be made lighter because of my guilty plea,
9.

No one has forced or threatened or coerced me to

obtain my plea of guilty and I am doing so of my own free will
and

after

discussing

it with my

attorney.

I know that any

opinions he may have expressed to me as to what he believes the
Court may do are not binding upon the Court.
riS

10.

No promises of any kind have been made to induce

me to plead guilty except that I have been told that if I do
^}N> plead guilty, the State has agreed
* ^ penalty

and

to

not

present

hearing before the court.
of

guilty

any

to not request

aggravating

the death

evidence

at the

I have also been informed that my plea

to the offense of FIRST DEGREE MURDER, a capital

offense, is conditional upon the court's imposition of a sentence
of life imprisonment.

I understand that should the court impose

the death penalty, I may withdraw my plea of guilty and require
the State of Utah to go forward with a trial in the matter. I am
also

aware

that

any

charge

or

sentencing

concessions

or

recommendations for probation or suspended sentences, including a
-4-

THE COURT:

Mr. Kanell, will you prepare the

commitment papers and the judgment?
MR. KANELL;

Would you like —

would it be

appropriate to indica-e in the order that a firearm was
used in the commission of the offense?
THE COURT:

Well, there hasn't been a plea taken

to that, but I think the factual basis, as we stated
it, is clear.
Perhaps what I would prefer you do is
obtain a copy cf the transcript of today's proceedings,
and ycu may attach that, if you wish, when we send it
up to the board of pardons.
MR. KANELL:
THE COURT:

Okay.

Thank you.

All right.

Anything else to be

taken care of?
MR. SHUMATE:
THE COURT:

No, Your Honor.
Thank you.

Good luck, Mr. Smith.

I need to inform you cf one other matter,
Mr. Smith.

You have the right to appeal the decisions

Gi> v.n^Ls wCur%» wCvkQy•
run today.

Tnaw rxgxiw s.c appea^. cag^Lns to

If you want to appeal, you have to file

notice of your intent to appeal with the clerk within
20 days of today's date.

If you fail to do that, ycu

lose your right to appeal.
Do ycu understand your right to appeal?
"""

PAUL G. MCMULLIN, CSR, RPR
P. C. Box 1524 - St. George, Ut. (801) 672-5215

reduction of the charges for sentencing made or sought by either
defense counsel or the prosecutor are not binding on the Court
and may or may not be approved or followed by the Court.
11.

I am not now under the influence of either drugs

or alcohol.
/^(*S

12. I have read this Statement or I have had it read

to me by my attorney and I have placed my initials beside each
paragraph to indicated that I know and understand its contents.
I am

JIJ/

the

\D~~

years of age, have attended school through
and I can read and understand the

English Language.

I have discussed its contents with my attorney

and I ask the Court to accept my plea of guilty to the charges
set forth above in this statement because I did, in fact,
(1)

on the 3rd day of October, 1988, intentionally and

knowlingly

caused the death of JAMES GLEN BRAY, while

engaged in the commission of an attempted,

aggravated

robbery;
(2) That I did so within Beaver County, State of
Utah.
:an.
DATED

this

/ V ^ d a y of Afov&i*

ktl*

1988.

TRACY EUGENE SMITH
Defendant
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THE COURT:

Mr, Kane11, anything?

MR.. KANELL:

Your Honor, pursuant to the plea

agreement, the State does not have any evidence of
aggravating circumstances to present, and the State
does not request the Court to sentence the defendant to
6

the death sentence,

7

THE COURT:

S

MR. KANELL:

9

THE COURT:

10

MR. KANELL:

11

Does not request that?
Does not request that.
All right.
The State requests the Court to

sentence the defendant to life in prison,

12

THE COURT:

12

MR. SHUMATE:

14

THE COURT:

Anything else?
I'll submit it, Your Honor.
All right.

Tracy Eugene Smith,

15

having been convicted by your own plea of the offense

16

of murder in the first-degree, a capital offense, in
violation of the laws of the State of Utah, I now
sentence you to the Utah State Prison for the rest of
your natural life.
I'm also going to make a recommendation to
the board of pardons, which I would like included in
the order, that Mr. Smith serve 20 years before he's
considered to be released from the Utah State Prison.
Anything else?
MR. SHUMATE:

No, Your Honcr.

PAUL G. MCMULLIN, CSR, RPR

CERTIFICATE OF DEFENSE ATTORNEY
I certify

that

I am the attorney

for TRACY EUGENE

SMITH, the Defendant above-named, and I know the Defendant has
read the Affidavit or that I have read it to the Defendant; I
have

discussed

it

with

the

Defendant

and

believe

that

the

Defendant fully understands the meaning of its contents and is
mentally and physically competent.

To the best of my knowledge

and belief, after an appropriate investigation, the elements of
the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of the Defendant's criminal
conduct are correctly stated, and these, along with the other
representations and declarations made by the Defendant in the
foregoing Statement are, in all respects, accurate and true.
DATED this f C/ day of /]/£,,<^Atf*~

/ 1988.

HUMATE*
ttorney for Defendant
CERTIFICATE OF^/PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah
in

its

reviewed

case

against

TRACY

the

Statement

declarations,

including

of
the

EUGENE
the

SMITH, Defendant.

Defendant

elements

of

and
the

find

I have
that

offense

of

the
the

charge(s) and the factual synopsis of the Defendant's criminal
conduct which constitutes the offense(s) are true and correct.
No improper inducements, threats, or coercions to encourage a
plea have been offered to the Defendant.
-6-

The plea negotiations

right?
MR. SMITH:

Yes, sir.

THE COURT:

All right.

You realize than and

I've already told you that if I sentence you today,
51
6

I it's going to be to the state prison for the rest of
/

your life.

71

Do ycu understand that?

8

MR. SMITH:

Yes, sir.

9

THE COURT:

And having that in mind, do you

10

still wish to waive your right to a delay?

11

MR. SMITH:

Yes, sir.

12

THE COURT:

All right.

12

that waiver.

14
15

Does either counsel wish to present
anything before I impose sentence?

16

Mr. Shumate?

17

MR. SHUMATE:

IS

THE COURT:

19

The record will reflect

No, Your Honor.
Mr. Smith, do you wish to make a

statement in your own behalf before I impose sentence?

*20.

MR. SMITH:

I'm sorry for what happened.

wish, you know, if he could feel my apology.

I

I knew

that it can't bring him back, but I didn't mean to do
"2B
24

it.
THE COURT:

Anything else?

MR. SMITH:

That's it.
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are fully contained in this Statement and in the attached plea
agreement or as supplemented on the record before the Court.
There_ is reasonable cause to believe the evidence would support
the conviction of the Defendant for the offense (s) for which the
plea(s) are entered and acceptance of the plea(s) would serve the
public interest.
DATED this f^/ti

V/^<^^\

day of

, 1988.

LEO G. KANELL
Beaver County Attorney
ORDER
Based

upon

the

facts

set

forth

in

the

foregoing

Statement of Defendant regarding Plea Bargain and the foregoing
Certificates of Counsel, the Court finds the Defendant's plea of
guilty is freely and voluntarily made, and it is so ordered that
the Defendant's pleas of "guilty" to the charge(s) set forth in
the foregoing Statement be accepted and entered.
The foregoing Statement of Defendant was signed before
me this

l¥-day

of

/£rt><^ntyW^, 1988.

Judge
88cr49

-7-

find that this plea is governed by the provisions of
the Alford-decision —

Alford versus North Carolina.

And I' m going to accept it on both of those bases, and
I'm going zo order the plea of guilty entered.
Recommendations regarding sentencing in
the matter?
MR. SHUMATE:

Your Honor, Mr. Smith would ask

the Court to allow him to waive the statutory time and
proceed with sentencing at this time rather than to
order the preparation of a presentence report, in view
of the nature of the plea and the c circumstances of the
facts before the Court.
I don't think that the Court sentencing
alternatives are substantial at all, and we're prepared
to go forward with that at this time.
THE COURT:

All right.

Does the State have any

objection?
MR. KANELL:
THE COURT:

The State does not oppose that.
All right.

Mr. Smith, just so

you're clear on this, the law allows you two days
before you're sentenced and up to 30 .days for
sentencing.

And you have the right to take advantage

of that delay if you wish.
Your counsel's indicated that you want to
give up that right and be sentenced today: is \:hat
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